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Abstract 
 
     Within humanitarian discourse, there is a prevailing narrative: the powerful liberal 
heroes are saving the helpless, weak victims. However, the beginning of the 21st century 
marks the expansion of the digital revolution throughout lesser-developed states. 
Growing access to the Internet has enabled aid recipients to communicate with the 
outside world, giving them an unprecedented opportunity to reshape discourses 
surrounding humanitarianism. Through a comparative discourse analysis of Libyan 
Tweets, 1994 newspaper reports on Bosnia, and 2011 newspaper reports on Libya, this 
paper analyzes whether aid recipient discourse can resist the dominant humanitarian 
narrative and if that resistance can influence dominant discourse, fundamentally altering 
the humanitarian enterprise.  I found Libyan Twitter users’ representations of aid and aid 
recipients, as well as their use of disruptive images and humor, challenged the dominant 
hero-victim narrative and had a limited, but meaningful impact on mass media discourse. 
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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
 
The end of the Cold War gave rise to a liberal humanitarian conviction that, at 
least for a moment, permeated consciences throughout the developed world. In the 1990s, 
the world witnessed a streak of humanitarian interventions in Iraq, Somalia, Haiti, 
Rwanda, East Timor, Sierra Leone and the former Yugoslavia.1 Each intervention was 
shaped by a unique political context, but yet there was a prevailing hero-victim narrative. 
Whether the intervention was a success or a disaster, for national self-interest or genuine 
humanitarian concern, each intervention had a hero2, a victim, and a villain. Affected 
populations were constructed as victims - as innocent women and children who were 
weak, vulnerable and in desperate need of heroic white men, which meant aid workers, 
peacekeepers, soldiers, and even civilian onlookers from abroad. Meanwhile, the target 
states of humanitarian aid, particularly their leaders, were characterized as irrational, 
tribal, and a threat to civility and peace. 3  
This narrative became so embedded within humanitarian discourse and 
commonplace understandings of aid that it influenced global mass media representations, 
as well as state and NGO humanitarian practices. The narrative shaped the way 
international actors understood and approached humanitarian crises: heroes should 
dominate, control and fix; villains should be killed, victims should be treated as passive 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Michael Barnett, Empire of Humanity: A History of Humanitarianism, (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2011). 
2 In some cases, like Rwanda, there was no real hero, but there were still failed heroes, actors who 
were suppose to be the hero, suppose to rescue the victims, but failed to act and thus betrayed 
their own identity. In discourses of Rwanda, there is still a normative judgment of the “heroes” – 
or Western states - for failing to fulfill their role within the humanitarian crisis. 
3 Anne Orford, Reading Humanitarian Intervention: Human Rights and the Use of Force in 
International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 47. 
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agents in need. While this hero-victim narrative may have turned the world’s attention to 
atrocities abroad, even instilled a sense of the responsibility to protect, it also contributed 
to a harmful power dynamic between aid providers and recipients. As the dangerous 
narrative gains traction and becomes widely accepted, aid recipients could begin to 
internalize the prescribed victim-identity and accept their disempowerment as natural.4  
Fortunately, the beginning of the 21st century marked the expansion of the digital 
revolution throughout lesser-developed states. Growing access to the Internet and mobile 
phones, as well as the emergence of Twitter, YouTube, text messages and blogs, enables 
aid recipients to communicate with the outside world. While there are still relatively low 
levels of access in developing states and even more communication barriers in times of 
political conflict, aid recipients are finding creative ways to make their voices heard, 
often with the help of their diaspora. Through global communication networks, aid 
recipients have an unprecedented opportunity to reshape discourses surrounding 
humanitarianism. With new voices contributing to humanitarian discourse, there is the 
potential for a revolutionary shift in norms, assumptions, and prescribed identities within 
the normative context of humanitarianism. 
This paper explores how aid recipients with new communication technology can 
influence humanitarian discourse. Historically, humanitarian discourse manifests as a 
hero-victim narrative, so the real question is whether aid recipient discourse resists that 
dominant hero-victim narrative or reinforces it. Therefore, this paper analyzes how aid 
recipients represent themselves, others, and humanitarianism as a whole, compared to the 
defined identities and embedded power dynamics within the dominant hero-victim 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 See: Kimberley Armstrong, “‘Seeing the Suffering’ in Northern Uganda: The Impact of a 
Human Rights Approach to Humanitarianism,” Canadian Journal of African Studies 42:1 (2008): 
1-32. 
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narrative. After concluding that aid recipient discourse does resist the dominant narrative, 
this paper investigates whether such aid recipient discourse can influence the way mass 
media represents humanitarianism. If aid recipient discourse can change the greater 
humanitarian discourse, then it can change inter-subjective and systemic understandings 
of reality, shift the normative context, and in turn, influence the behavior of international 
actors in regards to humanitarian intervention. 
To investigate whether the aid recipient voices can shift humanitarian discourse, I 
conducted a comparative case study of the Libyan civil war in 2011 and the civil war in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1994. I did a discourse analysis of 7,703 tweets from 11 
different Libyan Twitter users reporting on the events in Libya during February, March, 
April and May of 2011.5 I also conducted a discourse analysis of 307 articles on the 
Bosnian civil war from the New York Times, Washington Post and USA Today, published 
in January and February of 1994. I compared my findings to determine how, if at all, aid 
recipients characterized and understood humanitarian intervention differently than the 
mass media in 1994.  
Secondly, in order to determine whether Libyan aid recipient discourse influenced 
the larger, common humanitarian discourse, I compared mass media representations of 
Libya to the Libyan tweets and also to mass media representations of Bosnia. I analyzed 
233 articles from the New York Times, Washington Post and USA Today about the Libyan 
civil war, published in March and April of 2011. I attempted to identify ways the 
newspaper articles challenged the dominant hero-victim narrative similar to the aid 
recipient tweets, as well as ways they differed from mass media reports on Bosnia 20 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Libyan Twitter data set was provided by Steve Schohn from Recorded Future. 
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years earlier. I was also interested in seeing if the newspapers integrated aid recipient 
voices into their articles.  
The Libyan civil war and Bosnian civil war provide the best comparison of 
humanitarian crises because in both there was severe internal political conflict, and as a 
result, NATO set up a no-fly zone and conducted air strikes against authoritarian 
regimes.6 I use the empirical case studies of Libya and Bosnia to ground constructivist 
theories of discourse within the real world; these comparative case studies are meant to 
demonstrate whether, and how, discursive shifts can emerge from the ground up, 
transform larger discourses, and reshape our normative understandings. 
 To clarify the structure of my argument, I offer a brief road map. Chapter 2 
establishes the constructivist framework that motivates my project. In it, I explain how 
normative contexts shape our understandings of reality by defining what’s right, 
appropriate or even possible. Norms can be created by actors through a causal process or 
they can be naturally constituted, but this causation and constitution of norms can become 
muddled, leaving powerful actors to, consciously or unconsciously, shape normative 
contexts and have those norms, including prescribed identities, widely accepted as 
naturally true. After establishing the power of discourse and narratives in the shaping of 
normative contexts, I outline the content of the dominant hero-victim humanitarian 
narrative. I explain how international actors use the narrative to their advantage, while the 
narrative simultaneously shapes those actors’ beliefs and behaviors. 
Despite the humanitarian narrative’s constitutive power, I argue there is still an 
opportunity for aid recipients to recognize and resist the assumptions and identities 
imposed by the dominant hero-victim narrative. With the emergence of new 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 See further defense of case study selection on page 38. 
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communication technology throughout lesser-developed areas, even during humanitarian 
crises, there is now a global online network available for aid recipients to directly 
communicate with the outside world. Aid recipients now have the power to undermine 
traditional communication hierarchies and challenge the dominant humanitarian 
narrative, but the question remains whether aid recipients will take advantage of this 
opportunity and use their platform to challenge or simply reinforce the dominant 
narrative. 
Chapter 3 outlines the methodology of the comparative discourse analysis. It 
explains how the discourse analysis of the two comparative case studies, Libya in 2011 
and Bosnia in 1994, effectively test whether aid recipients challenge and transform the 
humanitarian narrative. In this chapter, I defend the selection of my two case studies, the 
civil wars in Libya and Bosnia, and argue these two humanitarian crises are comparable. I 
explain the process of collecting the data sets of tweets and newspaper articles as well as 
the method I used to analyze these texts. Finally, I provide the historical and political 
background for the humanitarian crises in Bosnia and Libya because understanding the 
context of the discourses is necessary for an effective discourse analysis. 
Chapters 4 and 5 investigate whether aid recipient discourse, broadcasted through 
Libyan Twitter users, resists the dominant humanitarian narrative. In Chapter 4, I analyze 
Libyans’ construction of the self and the other, the aid recipient and the aid provider, in 
comparison with the mass media’s construction of the aid recipient and aid provider in 
Bosnia. I first offer a brief overview of the civil wars in Libya and Bosnia and their 
respective humanitarian crises. I then compare the construction of aid recipients and 
providers in Libyan Twitter discourse to mass media’s construction of recipients and 
Noble	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providers during the Bosnian crisis. The interdependent construction of the self and the 
other is central to the humanitarian narrative and its embedded power relations. In the 
representations of aid recipients, Libyans were characterized as highly political agents, 
even martyrs, leading the efforts against the Gaddafi regime, while Bosnians were 
characterized as desperate and weak. As for aid providers, mass media in Bosnia 
glamorized sources of aid, while Libyans tweeted criticisms of NATO and refused to 
come hat in hand for help, but instead, demanded their right to international aid. 
In Chapter 5, I focus on three additional aspects of humanitarian discourse: 
images of suffering, use of humor, and representations of gender. These three categories 
are additional forms of aid recipient discourse that influence the identity construction of 
recipients and providers, as well as elucidate the ways aid recipients react and respond to 
the dominant humanitarian narrative. The images of suffering tweeted by Libyans are 
gruesome, disturbing and disruptive, while the images of suffering published in major 
newspapers in 1994 are pity provoking, relatable, and censored. In addition, Libyans, 
unlike mass media outlets in 1994, successfully used humor and irony to challenge the 
traditional power dynamics embedded in the humanitarian narrative through parodies, 
self-deprecation and satire. Finally, in terms of representations of gender, both Twitter 
and mass media from 1994 characterized female aid recipients as weak and in need of 
protection, which is a central tenant of the dominant hero-victim narrative. Thus, I found 
that Libyan aid recipients challenged the dominant humanitarian narrative, unlike mass 
media coverage of Bosnia, in their use of images of suffering and humor, but not in their 
representations of gender.  
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Chapter 6 examines whether the Libyan tweets influenced discourse beyond 
Twitter and transformed mass media’s representation of the Libyan humanitarian crisis. I 
analyzed 2011 mass media coverage of Libya in comparison with the Libyan tweets and 
the 1994 mass media coverage of Bosnia. The 2011 mass media coverage of Libya did 
not challenge the dominant humanitarian narrative in its images of suffering or use of 
humor or irony. The structural limits on mass media kept it from publishing disruptive 
images and the formality of the forum left no room for satire or humor. Mass media in 
2011 did, however, challenge the dominant humanitarian narrative’s representations of 
aid and aid recipients much like the Libyan tweets did, and it did integrate the voices of 
Libyans.  Unfortunately, while mass media did represent Libyans as highly political 
agents, the mass media then stopped talking about Libyans as aid recipients in a 
humanitarian crisis; they could not communicate the complex identities of aid recipients. 
The mass media did not depoliticize the narrative, but they did simplify it. I conclude that 
aid recipient discourse can influence mass media representations, but mass media will not 
represent recipients with multifaceted identities and will thus categorize them as soldiers 
or victims, but not both.  
Finally, in Chapter 7, I conclude that aid recipient voices, as expressed by Libyan 
twitter users, did challenge the dominant hero-victim narrative and did influence, to some 
extent, the larger global discourse and common understandings of the humanitarian 
intervention in Libya. I explain that the changing discourse of humanitarianism is worthy 
of exploration because it is the catalyst for humanitarian policy reform. NGOs and 
governments are already beginning to try new policies that integrate aid recipients into 
Noble	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providing their own aid.7 Cooperating with aid recipients for intelligence or coordinated 
networks to distribute aid are just the tip of the iceberg; a transformation in humanitarian 
discourse could open up whole new ways of thinking about humanitarian policy. 
Ultimately, this paper seeks to prove that the dominant humanitarian narrative that 
the international community has grown familiar with is not the only way of making sense 
of humanitarianism. This paper suggests that aid recipients, who are often disempowered 
by violence, poverty and their own aid providers, may have an opportunity to control 
their own narrative and reclaim their own identities. There may be an opportunity for a 
massive, grassroots, and discursive rebellion against the oppressive normative contexts of 
humanitarianism. 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Sheila Kinkaid and Katrin Verclas, “Wireless Technology for Social Change,” UN Foundation–
Vodafone Group Foundation Partnership, 2008. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Transforming the Normative Context of Humanitarianism: 
A Constructivist Framework 
  
Understanding Normative Contexts 
Shared values, beliefs, discourses and practices create particular normative 
contexts or common understandings of what is “good and appropriate.”8 Normative 
contexts create natural environments where certain actions are more or less desirable, 
likely or possible. The power of normative contexts is best understood through the lens of 
constitutive causality. As Ned Lebow argues, normative contexts influence ideas, norms 
and other political conditions to create channels of acceptable behavior and guide the 
interests of actors.9 Some channels may be wide and flexible providing actors with a 
large range of options. Other normative contexts may be narrow and constraining; these 
channels have a more direct influence on actors’ decisions. This paper focuses on the 
normative context of humanitarianism; it explores how historically contingent discourse 
and culturally determined roles and rules constitute the identities and preferences of 
donors, aid recipients and those watching from the stands. Humanitarian discourses form 
a normative context, which then defines actors and the range of acceptable decisions for 
actors to make.  
Normative contexts change over time as a result of agent-driven shifts in 
international norms. Rationalist theories explain international relations through shifts in 
power; they assert that decisions in international relations are inevitable consequences of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Martha Finnemore, National Interests in International Society, (New York: Cornell University 
Press, 1996), 2. 
9 Richard Ned Lebow, “Constitutive Causality: Imagined spaces and political practices,” 
Millennium: Journal of International Studies 38 (2009): 214. 
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human nature or of the structure of world politics. These theories can only explain 
political phenomenon in reference to top-down structures and relatively static power 
relations. It is hard for rationalist theories to explain how the least powerful individuals 
can collectively affect change in major political structures, like states, NGOs and 
international institutions. Thus, they cannot easily account for the conscious and active 
manipulation of discourse as a method of resistance. By contrast, a constructivist 
perspective, creates a space for activist discourse and grassroots movements to shape 
normative contexts. If we appreciate the power and fluidity of normative contexts we 
discover that important things happen in the world because “people interpret actions and 
events in new, bold, and creative ways.” 10  Discourses, originating from the least 
powerful, can shift the normative contexts that govern humanitarian practices.  
 Discourse is a method through which agents can change normative contexts. In 
this paper, discourses are not mere rhetorical framings of reality that shape perceptions 
and understandings; discourses are modes of thinking or “systems of meaning 
production” with narratives, texts, scripts and images that “enable us to make sense of the 
world.”11 Sometimes discourses combined with social practices, forms of subjectivity, 
and power, can even constitute knowledge itself. This definition of discourse blurs the 
distinction between discursive norms and material reality.12 Discourses can emerge in 
many different forms, but this paper focuses on narratives as a form of discourse. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 David Desller and John Owen, “Constructivism and the Problem of Explanation: A Review 
Article,” Perspectives on Politics 3 (2005): 598. 
11  Laura Shepherd, “Veiled References: Constructions of Gender in the Bush Administration 
Discourse on the Attacks on Afghanistan post-9/11,” International Feminist Journal of Politics 8 
(2006): 20. 
12 Chris Weedon. Feminist Practice and Postmodern Structuralist Theory (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1987), 108. 
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Narratives are “the codes that relate our normative system to our social 
constructions of reality and to our visions of what the world might be”.13 Narratives are 
stories that organize a series of events into a whole in an attempt to understand reality.14 
According to Robert Cover, who writes about the relationship between narratives and the 
law, “the very imposition of a normative force upon a state of affairs, real or imagined, is 
the act of creating narrative.”15 Cover continues to argue, “The intelligibility of normative 
behavior inheres in the communal character of the narratives that provide the context of 
that behavior.”16 This interpretation means all normative behavior is defined through 
narratives. Our behavior is only sane because we can locate it within a common script. 
Through manipulating and challenging that common script, actors can begin to reshape 
narratives, discourses and eventually normative contexts. 
It may be easy to see the methodology of discourse analysis, in relation to the 
construction of identities and narratives, as far removed from real world policy, but this 
would be a failure to understand the methodological process in use.  Lene Hansern 
explains: 
This research program is based on the assumption that policies are 
dependent upon representations of the threat, country, security problem, or 
crisis they seek to address. Foreign policies need to ascribe meaning to the 
situation and to construct the objects within it, and in doing so they 
articulate and draw upon specific identities of other states, regions, 
Peoples, and institutions as well as on the identity of a national, regional, 
or institutional Self.17 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Robert Cover, “Forward: Nomos and Narrative,” Harvard Law Review 97 (1983): 10. 
14 Jane Elliott, Using Narrative in Social Research: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches 
(London: Sage, 2005), 4. 
15 Robert Cover, “Forward: Nomos and Narrative,” 10. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Lene Hansen, Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War, (New York: 
Routledge, 2006): 5. 
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Thus, discourse analysis is an appropriate method of analyzing international relations, 
specifically humanitarianism, because international actors make real world decisions 
based on the identities, narratives, assumptions and other norms that are built up and 
solidified over time. Understanding the humanitarian narrative, and its potential 
transformations, is key to understanding humanitarianism in the real world. 
These interpretations of discourse and narrative challenge commonplace 
understandings of reality because they assert that our understandings of reality are 
socially, culturally and politically constructed and reliant on inter-subjective knowledge. 
Discourses do not frame events to appear more or less legitimate; they define what is 
legitimate, what constitutes knowledge, what is right and what is wrong. Even if 
humanitarian discourses do not have such a radical influence on our normative behavior, 
it is still important to understand that narratives are inevitable and have the potential to 
define reality. We must critically analyze the process through which reality is prescribed 
because embedded in the construction of reality and “systems of meaning production” is 
power.  
Causality and constitution are two seemingly distinct methods of explanation. 
Questions of causality focus on why and how physical or social phenomena happen, 
while questions of constitution are concerned with what something is, according to 
conceptual or logical necessity.18 There are two important differences between causation 
and constitution. First, causal influences, whether natural or artificial, can be identified 
and blamed. By contrast, it is difficult to pin point what or who is responsible for 
constituted truths since they are, by definition, necessarily true as a result of layered 
historical accounts and the amalgamation of inter-subjective norms. Second, in the social 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Richard Ned Lebow, “Constitutive Causality,” 3. 
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sciences, power plays a major role in causal relationships; power dynamics are often the 
go-to explanation for why and how things happen. However, power is less visible in the 
constitution of beliefs, practices or identities because constitution explains what 
something necessarily is, according to our shared experiences and beliefs. For example, 
most people do not question what power dynamics are embedded within linear logic 
because they see it as a natural phenomenon and don’t know any alternative. Despite 
distinct definitions, causation and constitution intertwine and can be mutually reinforcing. 
The overlap between the constitution and causation of discourse creates an avenue 
for powerful actors to shape constituted normative contexts in their favor. Ned Lebow 
explains the reciprocal and fluid relationship between constitution and causation in the 
context of constructing norms: 
Identities, metaphors, frames of references, concepts and analogies may 
start life as conscious inventions of actors used to justify and mobilise 
support for their goals. Even if they have prior existence, they may be 
used instrumentally by actors. Success, as in the cases of sovereignty or 
linear perspective, is likely to increase the availability and attractiveness 
of the identity or frame, enhancing its reach and power.19 
 
Thus, constituted norms and causal influences can interact and even reinforce one 
another. Actors can generate images or texts that support the constitution of particular 
norms or ideas. If actors can directly influence the constitution of norms then power can 
have a causal influence in what society understands as a necessary truth. Actors construct 
discourses to serve their own agenda and with enough resources, political clout and far-
reaching influence, the discourses can gain traction and become constitutive realities. 
The most prevailing and intrusive forms of oppression become possible when the 
conscious influence of powerful actors is hidden under a guise of constitutive realities. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Ibid., 218. 
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The fear is that a consciously invoked discourse like the “The War on Terror” may, over 
time, become accepted as natural and a frame of reference through which actors define 
themselves and each other.20 Norms and discourses that favor the powerful may become 
so ingrained that they are accepted as natural. Society may forget where the norms 
originated from or who created them. If society cannot recognize the source of the 
discourse, it is difficult to demonstrate how the discourse is a tool for a political or 
oppressive agenda. Worst of all, dominant discourses and narratives can become 
impossible to challenge because they eventually define people’s identities and influence 
whom and what people recognize as legitimate21. Humanitarian discourse sits in the 
middle of the constitution-causality continuum, enabling certain kinds of behavior and 
making others more difficult. It is an identifiable discourse but also one that shapes the 
identities of donors, aid recipients, and all actors involved in the humanitarian enterprise. 
Discourses can ascribe identities through a process of interpellation. Louis 
Althusser first used the term interpellation to describe the process by which ideology or 
cultural representation creates subjects.  The process begins with one party ‘calling out’ 
or ‘hailing’ the other. The target of communication responds and thus recognizes she is 
the subject being referred to; she recognizes the social position of the hailer as well as the 
position the hailer attributed her. According to Dr. Karen Crinall, “if the response is 
cooperative, the person is considered to have adopted the assigned or assumed subjective 
position.” 22 Interpellation is a continuous process; an individual’s sense of self is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Ibid. 
21 Steven Lukes, Power: A Radical View  (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 112. 
22 Karen Crinall, “Appealing for help: A reflection on interpellation and the intertextuality in the 
visual narrative of an Australian welfare campaign poster,” Current Naratives 1 (2009): 16. 
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“constantly being reconstituted in discourse each time we think or speak.” 23 
Interpellation is the “larger process whereby language constructs social relations for both 
parties in an act of communication and thus locates them in the broader map of social 
relations.” 24 Within narratives, there are exchanges of discourse in which interpellation 
creates subjects; subjects become inseparable from their assigned identities. Interpellation 
is natural and inevitable, but certain cultural representations are harmful. When narratives 
ascribe inferior, weak, even subhuman, characteristics to the subject, subjects are in 
danger of internalizing the ascribed identity and accepting a subordinate status.  
 
The Dominant Humanitarian Narrative 
 Humanitarian discourse centers on the humanitarian narrative, which has been 
constituted throughout history. Media, aid industries, states and international 
organizations help perpetuate the humanitarian narrative through propaganda, speeches, 
reports and the like, but the narrative is also produced through historical events, political 
tensions, academic debates, natural disasters, and many other factors outside of 
humanity’s direct control. It is difficult to identify exactly how the humanitarian narrative 
was produced because it is in part constituted by reality – it’s understood as natural and 
not a consciously created discourse. With that said, we can try to mark the evolutionary 
process that the humanitarian narrative underwent so as to better understand how it was 
formed and what it is. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Chris Weedon, Feminist Practice, 33. 
24 John Fiske, “Culture, Ideology, Interpellation,” in Literary Theory, An Anthology, ed. Julie 
Rivkin et al. (Malden: Blackwell, 1998), 308. 
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The concept of humanitarianism is, at least in part, a noble and revolutionary idea. 
Michael Ignatieff describes the basic proposition that motivates the humanitarian 
narrative: 
[There] is only one metanarrative drawing cones of safety and zones of 
danger together: the humanitarian narrative. We are in one world; we must 
shoulder each other’s fate; the value of life is indivisible. What happens to 
the starving in Africa and the homeless in Asia must concern us all 
because we belong to one species. The narrative, with its charter document 
– the Universal Declaration of Human Rights – and its agencies of 
diffusion – the nongovernmental humanitarian agencies and the U.N. 
system – puts a strong priority on moral linkages over economic and 
strategic ones.25 
 
At its core, the humanitarian narrative is a well-intentioned, moral argument that seeks to 
minimize global suffering. This idea that “we owe an obligation to all human beings by 
simple virtue of the fact that they are human” is a modern conception.26 This universal 
empathy is not natural, but something cultivated through normative contexts. According 
to Ignatieff, “there is nothing intrinsic about the emotions stirred in us by the television 
pictures of atrocity or suffering. Out pity is structured by history and culture.”27 
Therefore, the humanitarian narrative is a constructed, normative context. 
The humanitarian narrative appears as a hallmark of moral discourse, 
characterized by righteousness, sacrifice, and service. But at the same time, the moral 
superiority of the humanitarian narrative becomes a hero-victim metaphor that 
perpetuates particular identities, assumptions and norms that do not only fail to reflect 
reality, but harm aid recipients and limit our understanding of humanitarianism and how 
to respond to atrocities. The narrative becomes harmful and constraining through its 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Michael Ignatieff, “Television & Humanitarian Aid,” in Hard Choices: Moral Dilemmas in 
Humanitarian Intervention, ed. Jonathan Moore (Landham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998): 288. 
26 Ibid., 287. 
27 Ibid. 
Noble	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  
construction of static identities that reflect major power imbalances. David Chandler 
describes the humanitarian narrative as a “moral ‘fairy story’” with three components: 
“the hapless victim in distress,” “the savior, the aid agency, the international institution or 
even the journalists covering the story,” and “the villain, the non-Western government of 
state authorities.”28 
Aid recipients are represented as weak and helpless, which strips them of agency 
and, contrary to humanitarian ideals, strips them of their humanity. The humanitarian 
narrative characterizes aid recipients as weak and desperate so as to motivate external 
intervention – if recipients could help themselves or if they were not being treated like 
animals – then there would be less global interest in coming to their aid. Unfortunately, 
this narrative risks stripping aid recipients of “that which is most human about the victim: 
autonomy, dignity, and individual specificity.” Through the humanitarian narrative, 
“victimhood is abstracted to a level of universal anguishes and pure animal emotions.”29 
Aid recipients lose their personhood, or dignity, and are reduced to bare life. 
Second, aid providers (and citizens within donor states) are characterized as 
heroic, all-powerful, and largely infallible. Ignatieff explains, “the stories we create 
always place us as their chief subject… so, our imagination is always susceptible to 
moral narcissism. The stories we tell lead us to think better of ourselves than we 
deserve.”30 He believes the humanitarian narrative makes those from developed states 
feel better because they can contrast their situation with atrocities abroad – they can take 
pride in the “civility” and safety. Moreover, the narrative makes donor populations feel 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 David Chandler, From Kosovo to Kabul: Human Rights and International Intervention 
(London, UK: Pluto Press, 2002), 36-37. 
29 Denis Kennedy, “Selling the Distant Other: Humanitarianism and Imagery – Ethical Dilemmas 
of Humanitarian Action,” The Journal of Humanitarian Assistance 411 (2009): 1. 
30 Ignatieff, “Television & Humanitarian Aid,” 288. 
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more powerful because it tells them that they are actually capable of saving lives abroad 
or stopping the violence they witness, when in reality, such atrocities may be out of their 
control.  
Orford refers to the hero of the humanitarian narrative as the knight in white 
armor – the “masculine character 31  associated with qualities such as potency and 
authority… that main controlling figure with whom the spectator is invited to identify.”32 
She explains this imperialist character is “associated with attributes including freedom, 
creativity, authority, civilization, power, democracy, sovereignty and wealth.” These 
humanitarian heroes become the epitome of moral superiority as they set out to save the 
helpless and the weak on the other side of the world.  
Finally, the target states within the humanitarian narrative are characterized as 
chaotic, irrational and tribal. According to Orford, during the 1990s, target states were 
characterized by proponents of intervention as “racist and ruthless dictators, tribalism, 
ethnic tension, civil war and religious fundamentalism thrown up in a post-Cold War era” 
and thus in desperate need of help.33 Similarly, Ignatieff points out that when states do 
not want to intervene they use a similar narrative, the chaos narrative, which represents 
target states as “meaningless disorder, upon which no coherent pattern can be 
discerned.”34 The target state’s identity, assigned by the humanitarian narrative, pervades 
political debates, and is accepted as natural no matter whether the crisis warrants 
intervention. Target states are characterized as threatening or incapable in order to justify 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Because the masculine-feminine dichotomy parallels the hero-victim relationship within the 
humanitarian narrative, it reinforces harmful gender norms that categorize women as weak and 
subordinate and men as powerful and in control.  
32 Orford, Reading Humanitarian Intervention, 165. 
33 Ibid., 164. 
34 Ignatieff, “Television & Humanitarian Aid,” 289. 
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intervention, and in either case, the states and their leaders are seen as irrational, chaotic, 
and tribal. 
There may be other, smaller, characters within the humanitarian narrative, and 
some of these identities may at times overlap or slightly morph, but at the root of the 
narrative is an us-verse-them dichotomy. The international community defines itself 
through the creation of the other; it elevates its own status by characterizing the other as 
subordinate and in turn taking on the role of educator, savior, even colonizer. Orford 
explains, “The literature on humanitarian intervention treats those who lead or inhabit 
target states as the ‘other’ of the ‘international community’: as disordered chaotic, tribal, 
primitive, pre-capitalist, violent, exclusionary and child-like.35 In the words of Gayatri 
Spivak, the humanitarian narrative consists of “white men saving brown women from 
brown men.”36  
While the humanitarian narrative is a discourse in itself, constituted through 
layered accounts of history, international actors can still consciously invoke it, or 
perpetuate it, in order to gain more power. It’s important to understand the instrumental 
value of the narrative, so as to understand its real world consequences and the way it is 
further constituted over time. Mass media, NGOs, states and international institutions 
perpetuate it because it benefits them, or at least, they have learned how to take 
advantage of it.  
First, mass media reaffirms the hero-victim narrative because it is simplistic and 
easy to sell. Mass media has limited time and resources to sell a story, and its decisions 
are largely driven by profit. Ignatieff explains “The distorting bias here is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Orford, Reading Humanitarian Intervention, 47. 
36 Gayatri Spivak, A Critique of Postcolonial Reason: Toward a History of the Vanishing Present 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999), 303. 
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sentimentalization, because sentimental art, by definition, sacrifices nuance, ambivalence, 
and complexity in favor of strong emotion. Hence, it is art that prefers identification over 
truth.”37 Ignatieff believes that media will fabricate identities at the expense of moral 
truth in order to sell stories. Television fails to coherently explain the political or 
diplomatic contexts that lead to famine, war crimes, or other humanitarian crises. “It has 
a tendency to turn these into examples of man’s inhumanity to man; it turns them from 
political into natural disasters, and in doing so, it actively obscures the context 
responsible for their occurrences.”38 The media must also grab the attention of viewers 
and instigate intense emotions of sympathy or anger. Detailed stories of torture or a 
woman losing a child attract viewers and bolster the greater narrative that the victims are 
objects of pity and not agents of change.39 In this way, mass media fabricates identities, 
depoliticizes recipients, and characterizes them as weak and desperate to elicit viewer’s 
attention and sympathy, thus effectively perpetuating the dominant hero-victim narrative. 
Humanitarian NGOs also entrench dominant discourse; they use the humanitarian 
narrative to gain political and financial support. The hero-victim narrative characterizes 
aid workers as courageous saviors and recipients as weak innocents with no basic rights 
or meaningful agency. If aid recipients have no agency, then NGOs can easily justify 
intervention as the only option. Moreover, donors are less likely to view aid recipients as 
threats, if they are characterized as weak and helpless. The hero-victim narrative hides 
aid recipients’ political agendas in a façade of desperation and disempowerment in order 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Ignatieff, “Television & Humanitarian Aid,” 293. 
38 Ibid., 294. 
39 See also: Richard Wilson and Richard Brown, Humanitarianism and Suffering: the 
Mobilization of Empathy, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
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to attract more funding.40 NGOs are in constant competition with one another for 
funding, so like mass media outlets, NGOs are motivated to tell stories that “sell.” Daniel 
Roberts explains how Médecins Sans Frontières use the narrative to create an absolutist 
moral framework and remove complex politics from humanitarian discourse: 
MSF constructs a heroic persona for its members. Aided by the purity 
bestowed on the volunteer by way of the rhetoric of neutrality, the hero is 
counterpoised to the villain. […] Such a discursive counter-positioning of 
good and evil represents a kind of ‘identity freezing’ for both hero and 
villain, who are perceived to engage each other in a moralistic, high-stakes 
passion play. Meanwhile, the fate of the victims hangs in the balance.41 
 
This narrative establishes a moral binary; there are righteous heroes fighting evil villains. 
There is no gray area or complex identities, and thus, the justification for intervention 
made it seem irrefutable. In this way, the de-politicization of humanitarian crises 
cultivates blind and generous donors, which strengthens NGO power. 
International institutions also perpetuate the dominant narrative. H.L. Johnson 
conducted a qualitative analysis of UN publications and popular humanitarian discourse 
in order to investigate the relationship between media representations of refugees and 
maintenance of the north-south power divide. She concluded that, since the UNHCR 
institutionalized the international refugee regime, refugees have been racialized, 
victimized and feminized and all “within a discourse of depoliticisation of the refugee, 
denying the ﬁgure of the refugee the capacity for political agency.”42 International 
institutions can best justify intervention if politics is removed from the humanitarian 
crisis. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Daniel Robert DeChaine, Global Humanitarianism: NGOs And the Crafting of Community, 
(Lanham: Lexington Books, 2005), 85. 
41 DeChaine, Global Humanitarianism, 85. 
42 Heather Johnson, “Click to Donate: visual images, constructing victims and imagining the 
female refugee,” Third World Quarterly 32 (2011): 1015. 
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Finally, powerful states use the dominant humanitarian narrative to justify 
tyrannical intervention and post-intervention practices. Donor states use labels, such as 
‘victims’ and ‘threats,’ to justify stripping affected populations of their agency.43 Orford 
argues “the heroic narratives of humanitarian intervention make it possible for practices 
of economic exploitation to take place alongside military intervention, and for both to be 
coded as humanitarian.”44 For example, in November 2001, First Lady Laura Bush 
delivered a radio address to the people of Afghanistan and used the “brutal oppression of 
women” to justify the US invasion.45  She explained to the Afghan public that women 
were no longer imprisoned in their homes because of recent US military gains.46 Bush 
invoked the dominant humanitarian narrative to justify what was a highly political 
invasion with the purpose of strengthening US national security. Therefore, the hero-
victim narrative serves the interests of states and other powerful international actors. As a 
result, the narrative gains traction as a legitimate and true characterization of 
humanitarianism. 
Overall, powerful actors produce discourses that shape the dominant narrative in 
their interest, but it’s important to remember the narrative also exists independently of 
political agendas and can influence how powerful actors define their interests in the first 
place. Humanitarian norms and the interests of powerful international actors are separate 
but also mutually reinforcing, paralleling Lebow’s comparison of constitution and 
causality. For example, when Laura Bush spoke out about the brutal oppression of 
women in Afghanistan, it may not have been a constant manipulation of the humanitarian 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Ibid. 
44 Orford, Reading Humanitarian Intervention, 159. 
45 Ghazi-Walid Falah and Caroline Nagel, Geographies of Muslim Women: Gender, Religion, and 
Space, (New York: The Guilford Press, 2005), 45. 
46 Ibid. 
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narrative to justify a political war; Bush may have given the radio address because the 
humanitarian narrative framed the way she saw and understood the intervention in 
Afghanistan. While actors may consciously manipulate humanitarian discourse, their 
beliefs and practices are all genuinely shaped by the discourse, the normative context of 
humanitarianism. The dominant humanitarian narrative is the invisible veil of constitutive 
causality because it is a tool for powerful actors to serve their own interests, often at the 
expense of others, but is also accepted as a constitutive truth and commonplace 
understanding. Therefore, powerful actors like the mass media, NGOs and international 
institutions have an avenue to shape the humanitarian narrative, but they are 
simultaneously constrained by it. 
This dominant humanitarian narrative channels the behavior of states, NGOs and 
international institutions. Layered historical accounts, images and norms influence the 
decisions and policies of international actors. The narrative is ingrained in their 
epistemological understanding of humanitarianism. While there are policy debates among 
humanitarians, the general status quo approach to humanitarian crises is understood as 
the appropriate, and perhaps only, option. However, absent the dominant narrative, 
humanitarian policies might look very different.  For example, states and NGOs might be 
more likely to consider viable strategies that require the heavy involvement of aid 
recipients. Historically, state and NGO problem solving fixates on what they can do to 
serve vulnerable recipients instead of how they can enable or utilize the recipients. Of 
course, over time, aid organizations have begun to understand the importance of 
empowering the populations their serve, but even that empowerment is often the goal of 
aid and not the means of providing aid. Aid providers do not think of all the ways in 
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which aid recipients could contribute to their efforts because they are chained to an 
understanding of humanitarianism that characterizes aid recipients as helpless. Recently, 
there has been an emergence of humanitarian policies47 aimed at empowering and 
enabling recipients, but as long as the dominant hero-victim narrative is embedded within 
humanitarian discourse, our ways of understanding, interpreting and approaching 
humanitarianism will be constrained. 
Through the naturalization, or widespread acceptance, of the dominant 
humanitarian narrative, the identities of aid recipients and donors become constituted 
through a process of interpellation. This process of interpellation leads to the 
naturalization of hierarchical and oppressive social relations. The narrative stereotypes 
aid recipients as desperate and incapable. When these characteristics are accepted and 
internalized, recipients have a disempowered sense of self. When aid recipients are 
“stripped of context and reduced to the most basic of rights, to pure animal emotions, 
they become personless—they lose their human dignity.”48 Aid recipients may internalize 
the imposed identity and grow to understand themselves as permanently inferior, 
dependent, and subhuman. While there are no empirical studies demonstrating 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 For example, crowdsourcing maps are being used to coordinate the distribution of aid and meet 
the urgent needs of aid recipients. See: “About Us,” Ushahidi, 2013. 
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interpellation with aid recipients49, there have been numerous studies confirming how 
racial narratives influence African American’s own identity.50  
The internalization of a prescribed identity means that the actors’ interests, beliefs 
and desires become shaped by the dominant discourse, making resistance difficult.51  
Because discourse has the power to construct identities, it has the power to not just 
oppress individuals from the outside, but transform who they are and what their interests 
are. Lene Hansen explains: 
To theorize identity as constructed through discourse, and for policy to be 
dependent thereon, is to argue that there are no objective identities located 
in some extra-discursive realm… this implies a conceptualization of 
identity existing only insofar as it is continuously rearticulated and 
uncontested by competing discourse.52 
 
Thus, a narrative that assigns a population an identity of disempowerment may be one of 
the most powerful tools of oppression because it does not just deny a group power, but 
actually makes them believe, act, and eventually be disempowered. Fortunately, the 
dominant humanitarian narrative sits in the middle of Lebow’s continuum, meaning it has 
not become entirely internalized and accepted as natural.53 We still hear academics, 
policymakers, and even aid recipients, identify the humanitarian narrative as something 
separate from descriptive reality; it is still possible to identify the way the narrative 
imposes false identities and metaphors because we have not full accepted it as a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Kimberley Armstrong’s study of the IDP camps in Northern Uganda comes closest to 
documenting aid recipient interpellation, but in her analysis, she explains it’s unclear whether the 
refugees have truly adopted a subordinate and helpless identity or if they are consciously 
performing for outsiders so as to attract more aid. See: Armstrong, “‘Seeing the Suffering’,” 1-32. 
50 Gwen Bergner, “Black Children, White Preference: Brown v. Board, the Doll Tests, and the 
Politics of Self-Esteem,” American Quarterly 61 (2009): 299-332. 
51 Lukes, Power: A Radical View, 119. 
52 Hansen, Security as Practice, 5. 
53 Lebow, “Constitutive Causality,” 236. 
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constitutive reality. While the humanitarian narrative’s assumptions influence behavior, 
beliefs and norms, there is still space to maneuver and challenge those assumptions.  
Despite interpellation, aid recipients’ identities are not fully internalized so 
resistance remains possible. James Scott argues victims of domination may play the role 
of their assigned identity in order to survive, but they are also tactical and inspiring. 
Subjects of domination never fully internalize the narratives that devalue and stereotype 
them, but instead, adopt a ‘double consciousness’. W.E.B. Du Bois describes double 
consciousness as “this sense of looking at one’s self through the eyes of others, of 
measuring one’s soul by the tape of a world that looks on in amused contempt and 
pity.”54 If aid recipients can maintain their own unique understanding of reality, despite 
the dominant humanitarian discourse that surrounds them, then they still have a 
framework for resistance. 
Resistant discourse can be hidden, but the most effective form of resistance is 
overt. Scott, who describes resistance in the context of slavery, believes that resistance to 
domination can be found in ‘hidden transcripts’ that exist in private life, like in the 
household or in religious and ritual life. Sometimes resistant discourse is also in open 
spaces but disguised as folktales, songs and jokes. Victims of domination “insinuate a 
critique of power while hiding behind anonymity.”55 However, slaves’ quiet resistance to 
the master’s hailing call may never be heard beyond the walls of the slave corridors. By 
contrast, explicit acts of rebellion, like revolts, often inspire other slaves to disobey, flee 
or challenge their master because the practice of resistance, once inconceivable, becomes 
possible. Confrontational discourses challenge the slave’s natural subordination and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 W.E.B. Du Bois, The Souls of Black Folk, (New York: New American Library, 1969), 45. 
55 James Scott, Domination and the arts of resistance: hidden transcripts (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1990), xiii. 
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widen the range of possibilities. Thus, resistant discourses are most effective when 
masters have to confront them. Of course, these explicit acts of resistance, in the context 
of slavery, are also dangerous. The leader of a revolt often sacrifices her life in an attempt 
to challenge the normative context that legitimizes slavery. 
Unlike slaves, aid recipients in the 21st century have a relatively safe forum to 
resist the dominant humanitarian narrative. Expanding access to the Internet provides aid 
recipients a forum to challenge dominant discourse through overt transcripts, while 
remaining anonymous when necessary. When aid recipients speak out on the instant 
global communication network they confront the powerful actors that perpetuate the 
dominant narrative including mass media, NGOs, states and international institutions. 
The emergence of new communication technology over the last 20 years gives aid 
recipients the opportunity to resist the master’s hailing call; it provides victims of 
domination with a method to define their own identity. 
 
The Emergence of New Communication Technology 
Over the last ten years we have witnessed rapid global communication networks 
expand to all corners of the globe. Between 2000 and 2012, Internet has become 
increasingly accessible in lesser-developed states. Since 2000, the number of Internet 
users in Latin America has grown by 1,205.1% and the number of users in Africa has 
grown by 2988.4%. About 39.9% of the Latin American population is online, including 
19.6% of Bolivia and 55.9% of Colombia. Only 13.5% of Africa is online, but the growth 
rates are skyrocketing. In 2000 the Democratic Republic of Congo had 500 Internet users. 
Eleven years later, there are 915,400 users, which may only mean 1.3% of the population 
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is online but also means there is a 1830.8% growth rate of internet access in one of 
poorest countries in the world. It is important to remember that aid recipients in Libya, 
with only 5.9% of its population online, used Twitter, Facebook and YouTube during the 
2011 humanitarian crisis.56 Aid recipients can communicate with the rest of the world 
even when Internet access is low.  
However, despite the growth of Internet access, Internet users still represent a 
specific demographic. Karl Feld describes the demographic of Middle East and Northern 
African Internet social media users: “They use it in Arabic and English. Many are 
expatriates. They tend to be younger, male and single more often than the general 
telephone owning population. Most are highly educated and employed or students in 
middle and upper social classes.”57 Unfortunately, there are no class, gender or even age 
demographics for my data set because the Libyans Twitter users were largely 
anonymous, especially if they were in Libya or had family in Libya that could suffer 
retaliation from Gaddafi forces. With that said, it is likely my data set represents the 
demographic Feld describes. Moreover, the most desperate of aid recipients probably 
have much less access to the global communication network and thus their voices may 
not be fully represented in my qualitative analysis either. While aid recipient voices on 
the Internet may not yet be fully representative, the Internet usage statistics demonstrate 
there is a growing trend of Internet access in the most under-developed and conflict-
ridden states. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 “Internet World Stats: Usage and Population Statistics.” Miniwatts Marketing Group, 2011, 
accessed April 15, 2012, http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm. “Internet usage data 
collected by Nielsen Online, International Telecommunications Union, GfK, local Regulators and 
other reliable sources.” 
57 Karl Feld and Brittany Shanks, “Internet Media Use and Middle Eastern Public Opinion,” D3 
Systems, http://www.cicpo.gov.eg/Day1/Karl%20G.Feld.pdf. 
Noble	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29	  
Humanitarian crises hinder, but do not eliminate, aid recipient access to global 
communication networks. An organization called Technology’s Refuge conducted a study 
composed of 30 interviews and 43 surveys with refugees, both male and female, from 
different regions of the world. Refugees were asked about communication in situations of 
conflict and dislocation. Many refugees cited unreliable telephones because war and 
violence often damaged communication infrastructure and disconnected phone lines. 
Refugees also reported that many existing telecommunication services required money 
they did not have. While there were many difficulties in accessing communication 
technologies during crises, the refugees did express some success in the use of mobile 
devices. Mobile devices were often an effective means of communication even if it 
required standing on a hill for a connection or sharing phones.58 As the rate of Internet 
use and mobile coverage grows, victims are likely to gain increasing access to 
communication networks even during humanitarian crises. 
In addition, many NGO aid organizations are working to increase Internet access 
in refugee camps. For example, internally displaced person camps in Northern Uganda 
were completely disconnected from the rest of Uganda and the world at large until an 
organization called BOSCO Uganda, which stands for Battery Operated Systems for 
Community Outreach, began to spread new communication technology throughout the 
camps in 2007.   BOSCO, with the help of an organization called Inveneo, distributed 
specially designed PCs that can be powered by solar panels or bicycle pedals. These 
computers can access the web via long distance WiFi transmitters. BOSCO successfully 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 Linda Leung, “New Issues in Refugee Research: Taking Refuge in Technology: 
Communication Practices in Refugee Camps and Immigration Detention,” (Switzerland: 
UNHCR, 2011), 20-24. 
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brought many IDP camps online, including those in Gulu, Pabbo, Alero, Lacor, Coope, 
Jen'Geri, Unyama, and Pagak.59  
Unfortunately, infrastructure is not the only barrier between aid recipients and 
access to the Internet. State governments often shut down the Internet in response to 
internal political conflict during a humanitarian crisis. Civilians use the Internet, 
including Twitter and Facebook, to organize protests and expose their states’ internal 
affairs to the rest of the world.  As a result, states experiencing political unrest have a 
strong incentive to block communication among their own people and with the rest of the 
world. Most authoritarian regimes have one state controlled Internet carrier and can 
easily slow it down or shut it off entirely. For example, in 2009 China shutdown 
cellphone and Internet services when there was unrest in the Muslim region of Xinjiang. 
Just this year, there have been severe Internet slowdowns in Bahrain and Iran as protests 
escalated, and Mubarak completely shut down the Internet in Egypt, severing its 20 
million online users from any Internet contact with the outside world.60 While some 
Internet shutdowns are just a response to political unrest, others are used to hide 
humanitarian crises from the outside world. For example, Internet was shutdown in Syria 
and Libya amid reports of brutal state violence against groups of civilians.61 Perpetrators 
may block civilians from global communication networks to hide humanitarian crises and 
avoid international sanctions or interventions. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 Tim Cocks, “Uganda Refugees Go Online,” Reuters UK, July 12, 2007. 
60 David Crockett, “Is Forcing Open the Internet a Next Frontier for Humanitarian Intervention?” 
TechChange, February 18, 2011, accessed April 15, 2012, http://techchange.org/2011/02/18/is-
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61 Jim Cowie, “Syrian Internet Shutdown,” Huffington Post, March 6, 2011, accessed April 15, 
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As Internet shutdowns become a popular tactic to cover up humanitarian crises, 
donor states, NGOs and aid recipients have developed the power to override a state’s 
control over Internet access. The US, for example, has many satellite and non-satellite 
devices that could force connectivity on a country against its wishes. States must be 
careful how they use these new tools since, without precedent, the imposition of Internet 
access could be seen as an act of war.62  However, if states hesitate to open up 
communications, the “hacktivist” group Anonymous can intervene, free of state 
responsibilities. Anonymous helped Tunisian protesters break through barriers and access 
the Internet. Tunisians also sent Anonymous videos of atrocities happening on the 
ground, which the hacker group then posted on Youtube for the world to see.63 Finally, 
aid recipients themselves find ways around state sanctioned Internet blackouts.  Despite 
the Internet shutdown during the 2011 humanitarian crisis in Libya, citizens accessed the 
Internet “through dial-up connections and other ISPs,” and quickly sent each other access 
codes for Facebook, Twitter and Google.64 Aid recipients in humanitarian crisis find 
ways around poor infrastructure or government shutdowns in order to communicate with 
each other and the wider world through online networks. 
 Therefore, the global online communication network is a relatively effective 
method for aid recipients to speak out to the rest of the world. Internet access is growing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 Spencer Ackerman, “U.S. Has Secret Tools to Force Internet on Dictators,” Wired, February 7, 
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63 “Tunisia protesters use Facebook, Twitter and YouTube to help organize and report,” Los 
Angeles Times, January 14, 2011, accessed April 15, 2012, 
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in the poorest and most conflict-ridden states, and while many of aid recipients with 
Internet access represent a somewhat privileged demographic, the ongoing expanse of the 
Internet is still giving many aid recipients a voice in international humanitarian discourse 
when they were previously silent, distant subjects of humanitarianism. Humanitarian 
crises are a barrier to accessing the global network because infrastructure often falls apart 
and many people are displaced. However, aid recipients are still finding access during 
crises through online mobile devices and long distance wifi transmitters in refugee 
camps. State-mandated Internet shutdowns threaten aid recipient access, but donor states, 
hacktivist groups and aid recipients themselves are quick to find ways around state 
sanctioned Internet blackouts. Connecting with the outside world is difficult during a 
humanitarian crisis, but the expanse of new communication technology is making it 
easier, and for the first time, many aid recipients have a voice in global humanitarian 
discourse. 
In the recent past, literature has addressed the role of new communication 
technology in the funding and coordination of humanitarian aid. In 2009 the UN 
published a 60-page report entitled “New Technologies in Emergencies and Conflicts: 
The Role of Information and Social Networks,” which discusses how new technologies 
support NGO operations through the prevention, aid, and development stages of 
humanitarian crises.65 The UN Foundation, alongside the Vodafone Foundation, also 
published a report called “Disaster Relief 2.0: The Future of Information Sharing in 
Humanitarian Emergencies.”  It analyzes how humanitarian, volunteer, and technical 
communities effectively communicated in the wake of the Haiti earthquake with the use 	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of new technologies. 66  The discussion of new communication technology in 
humanitarianism largely centers on its use among humanitarian workers and its impact on 
the effectiveness of humanitarian aid. While there is some literature in response to the 
role of technology in the Arab Spring67, there is no significant body of literature that 
looks at aid recipients’ use of the new technology in the context of humanitarianism.  
More authors discuss how mass media contributes to the dominant humanitarian 
narrative and constructs aid recipients as weak and helpless. For example, Heike Harting 
argues the spectacle of the African corpse is a western representation of the Rwandan 
Genocide that dehistoricizes and manipulates reality in imperialist ways.68  Similarly, 
Richard Wilson discusses the dehumanizing ways in which NGOs use the media to 
mobilize empathy for their humanitarian goals.69 However, such literature only discusses 
the western media’s portrayal of aid recipients; it does not yet account for the emergence 
of citizen journalism among affected populations or how such populations represent 
themselves in global media. Current literature misses the significant point that, while 
technology usually develops in donor states, these technologies are now finding 
application and widespread use in lesser-developed states. The important development is 
how new communication technology, in the hands of those who suffer in humanitarian 
crises, may influence humanitarian narratives.  
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The growth of new communication technology in less developed states has 
expanded participation in humanitarian discourse. The normative context of 
humanitarianism has always been shaped by the discourses of mass media, large NGOs, 
and powerful states, but now new voices with unique perspectives are emerging. With 
new communication technologies, those negatively affected by humanitarian crises now 
have the opportunity to tell their stories to the rest of the world. Governments, NGOs, and 
average citizens of donor states are beginning to listen to the stories of those suffering 
from natural disasters or violent regional conflict through expanded social media 
networks such as Twitter, Facebook or YouTube.  
Despite the overwhelming structural powers of mass media, NGOs and states, aid 
recipient discourse can influence the dominant humanitarian narrative through two 
interrelated processes. First, aid recipients’ stories are told as they unfold; they tend to be 
fragmented and express raw emotion. Their stories can attract global attention because 
“first-hand testimonies, visceral accounts, and graphic images help to dramatize and 
humanize stories, injecting emotion, and urgency into the stories of people’s plight and 
pain.” 70 Aid recipient discourse has power because it comes from people on the ground 
amidst a humanitarian crisis and at a time when mass media outlets usually have limited 
ground access. They are a source for the most up to date news about the crisis and have 
dramatic and shocking personal experiences that the international community desperately 
wants to hear. The influence of a particular discourse is often determined by the power of 
the speaker or the number of speakers promoting the same message. However, aid 
recipient discourse gains its influence from powerful stories of trauma and resilience.  	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Second, aid recipient discourse circumvents traditional relations of 
communicative power. Stuart Allan explains: 
While corporate news organizations seek to expand market shares and 
colonize communication space around the globe, citizen journalism it 
seems has managed to insinuate itself inside corporate news packages 
while simultaneously staking out independent platforms of news delivery 
and world-wide dissemination. As citizen journalism progressively 
ingratiates itself into today’s differentiated news ecology so inevitably it 
unsettles, reconfigures, or simply bypasses traditional hierarchies and 
relations of communicative power.71 
 
Thus, mass media no longer monopolizes communicative power. Social networking sites 
that disseminate information 24-7 have challenged the traditional news filter. Discourses 
that interest or amaze the public can gain mass attention without money or infrastructure. 
Thus, aid recipients in humanitarian crises have an opportunity to challenge mass media, 
NGO and state strongholds over humanitarian discourse. The emergence of new 
communication technology has created a forum for aid recipient discourse, but only the 
content of that discourse will determine whether recipients actually challenge or 
transform the existing dominant narrative.  
Aid recipient discourses through tweets, blogs or YouTube videos are not 
revolutionary simply by nature of the source or method of communication. The 
emergence of aid recipient discourse is not necessarily liberating or resistant to current 
normative contexts. Hansen explains:  
Subjective forms of knowledge can be used to destabilize established 
constructions of collective identity, but they might also be appropriated to 
reproduce collective narratives that discipline and distance the Other. They 
hold distinct possibilities and dangers when mobilized in a political 
context, as do all other forms of writing, but the key to analysis, as well as 
to political practice, is to understand their distinct form, authority, and 
attraction.72 	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Thus, discourses of any form have the potential to re-entrench, break down or transform 
collective narratives that construct and alienate subjects. We should not assume aid 
recipients will use this new forum to challenge the dominant humanitarian narrative 
because they may have already accepted the narrative, and their victim identity, as 
natural, or they may believe the narrative is in their interest and that they benefit from 
being perceived as helpless victims. 
For example, Kimberley Armstrong conducted research in the IDP camps in 
Northern Uganda and concluded that the displaced persons, when given the opportunity 
to speak out, reinforce the humanitarian narrative and embrace their role as the helpless 
weak victims. She explains that victims in Northern Uganda embrace their status as 
helpless victims in order to gain financing and political influence; they understood how 
the narrative functions and that aid providers want to play the role of the hero, saving 
them, the helpless victims. Northern Ugandans are aware that it is the image of their 
helplessness and suffering that mass media and NGOs can sell and that will bring more 
attention and funding to the IDP camps. After speaking with refugees in the IDP camps, 
Armstrong believes their stories are distorted to fit the victim identity assigned by 
dominant humanitarian narrative. She writes: 
In narrating their experiences, many of the people in the camps were 
playing out what they had come to understand as their role in interactions 
with foreigners, while at the same time defining the role of the interlocutor 
with whom they are speaking. […] In this way, the displaced people of 
northern Uganda have recognized themselves as symbols of suffering and 
objects of sympathy […] the population they are representing, namely the 
victims of violence, conflict, poverty, and corruption, has achieved no 
greater status or position.73 
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Thus, it is possible that aid recipients use new communication technology to strengthen, 
instead of deconstruct, the victim status enforced by traditional humanitarian narratives.  
Therefore, the question at hand is how aid recipient discourse, as expressed 
through new modes of communication technology, differs from the dominant 
humanitarian narrative, if at all. My study analyzes the discourse of aid recipients through 
new communication technology in comparison with the more institutionalized 
humanitarian discourse espoused by mass media. By analyzing how aid recipients 
characterize themselves and other actors involved in humanitarianism, we can determine 
whether aid recipient discourse re-entrenches the hero-victim narrative or resists 
dominant discourse, the master’s hailing call.  
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Chapter 3 
 
Methodology: 
Discourse Analysis of Comparative Case Studies 
 
Case Study Selection 
In order to determine the constructivist power of grassroots shifts in discourse, 
there must be an empirical analysis of discourse. The emergence of new communication 
technology has provided us with a unique research opportunity to see how discourse 
might be able to transform normative contexts from the bottom up. I chose to compare 
humanitarian discourse from the case studies of Libyan in 2011 and Bosnia in 1994 
because in both there was a civil war, which received international attention, and in both, 
NATO set up a no-fly zone and conducted air strikes against the authoritarian regimes. 
Additionally, the two crises are separated by an immediate influx of Internet access in 
lesser-developed states, which enables us to compare humanitarian discourse with and 
without aid recipient voices within a relatively short and controlled timeframe. 
Documented humanitarian discourse from fifteen to twenty years ago can demonstrate 
what the dominant humanitarian narrative looked like before the emergence of aid 
recipient discourse through new communication technologies. This short time frame also 
limits the number of extraneous variables that could influence a change in humanitarian 
discourse. 
Admittedly, there was a larger scale humanitarian crisis in Bosnia than in Libya. 
The International Committee of the Red Cross reports 200,000 people were killed in 
Bosnia, including 12,000 children. In addition, 50,000 women were raped and 2.2 million 
were forced to flee their homes. The Serbian attack against Bosnia and Herzegovina 
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civilians was a full-scale genocide.74 By contrast, the death toll in Libya, while still 
highly contested, was much lower, between 2,000 and 30,00075, with about 500,000 
people displaced.76 More importantly, most deaths in Libya were from the civil war and 
not the systematic killing of an ethnic group, though it is possible that absent intervention 
there could have been more widespread violence. Because of the larger scale attacks in 
Bosnia, the Bosnian civil war is often labeled a humanitarian crisis more often than the 
civil war in Libya, but in both states innocent civilians were deprived of basic resources 
and killed due to internal violence and both interventions were publically justified by the 
need to protect civilians.  
Another key difference between the case studies of Libya and Bosnia is the 
political context in which they occurred. The Libyan humanitarian crisis took place in the 
context of the Arab Spring, a series of revolutionary uprisings across the Middle East and 
Northern Africa. It is possible Libyan aid recipients displayed more ‘agency’ (or were 
perceived as having more agency) than Bosnian recipients since their political agenda 
was all about self-empowerment. Of course, one could argue that the Arab Spring 
narrative emerged as a result of aid recipient voices being broadcasted throughout the 
world through new communication technology, in which case the political context of the 
Arab Spring is evidence of my argument and not a problem of alternative causality. At 
minimum, it is hard to understand the Arab Spring as a phenomenon completely 
independent of new communication technology and aid recipient agency. Thus, my 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 Haris Silajdžić, “Bosnia and Herzegovina: Statement,” New York: United Nations September 
23, 2008 at 63rd Session of the General Assembly. 
75 Karin Laub, “Libyan estimate: At least 30,000 died in the war,” Associated Press in The 
Guardian, September 8, 2011, accessed May 5, 2012, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/feedarticle/9835879. 
76 Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre and Norwegian Refugee Council, “Internal 
displacement in the Middle East and North Africa,” Global Overview (2011). 
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research has the potential to prove that the agency of recipients, expressed through new 
communication technology, played at least some role in challenging the dominant hero-
victim narrative.  
It is also important to remember that aid recipients in Bosnia, while not part of a 
string of successful revolutionary movements, were fighting for freedom from the 
Yugoslav People’s Army and for their own sovereign territory. Brendan Simms believes 
the closest parallel to the Libyan intervention is the Bosnian intervention between 1992-
1995 because of the parallels between the Arab Spring and the collapse of former 
Yugoslavia. Simms, shortly after the Libyan uprising, argued: 
The wars of the Yugoslav succession were part of a general collapse of 
communism in Eastern Europe, while the Libyan revolt is part of the wave 
of Arab popular protest that has swept across North Africa and much of 
the Middle East over the past six weeks. Above all, the mismatch between 
the lightly armed rebels and the heavy weaponry of the regime makes a 
massacre possible if the dictator throws off all restraint.77 
 
Therefore, there is a close parallel between the political contexts in Bosnia and Libya. 
While no comparison is perfect, the conflict and intervention in Bosnia best parallels the 
2011 crisis in Libya. These two comparable humanitarian crises provide an opportunity 
to compare humanitarian discourses, from aid recipients and mass media, before and after 
the expansion of Internet access throughout lesser-developed states. 
 
Discourse Analysis 
The discourse analysis compares Libyan Twitter users’ tweets reporting on Libya 
in 2011 with newspaper articles reporting on Bosnia in 1994. The study then compares 
newspaper articles reporting on Libya in 2011 with the Libyan tweets. My discourse 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 Brendan Simms, “What Bosnia teaches us about the Middle East,” New Statesman, March 4, 
2011, 34.  
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analysis is based on original research of these primary texts. I received my data set of the 
Libyan tweets from research analyst Steve Schohn at Recorded Future because there is no 
longer any way to access all the Twitter users’ full archives. I received the archives of 22 
different Libyan Twitter users’ tweets published from February to May of 2011.  
While I had no choice to analyze tweets from any other time period, these four 
months best represent the discourse surrounding the Libyan civil war because they were 
the first four months of the conflict; include the transition from no international aid to full 
NATO involvement; and were the four months in which the Libyan civil war received the 
most international attention. I then narrowed the data set from 22 to 11 Twitter users who 
I could confirm were Libyan, and either in Libya or well connected to people in Libya. I 
included Libyans living outside of Libya because they shared the aid recipient identity 
and, most importantly, echoed the sentiments of actual aid recipients on ground who 
could not access Twitter but could communicate with friends and family abroad. The 
Libyan diaspora functioned as a megaphone for the Libyan community receiving aid in 
Libya.  
Moreover, while most of the tweets were in English, I removed sporadic tweets in 
Arabic because I am ultimately interested in how the Libyan Twitter discourse 
communicates with the outside world and influences larger, dominant discourses, 
particularly the US media. Tweets in English are more likely to influence those dominant 
discourses. Finally, I deleted all re-tweets and all tweets linking to mass media news 
articles so as to make the data more manageable and to guarantee I am analyzing Libyan 
discourse and not mass media discourse quoted by Libyans. This left me with 7,703 
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tweets from 11 different Libyan Twitter users reporting on the events in Libya during 
February, March, April and May of 2011. 
 The second data set, newspaper articles from 1994 reporting on Bosnia, were 
collected through the Lexis Nexis archives of the New York Times, Washington Post, and 
USA Today. I limited my search to articles published in January and February of 1994 
and that included the word Bosnia, Bosnian, or Sarajevo in the headline. This limited 
search produced a data set of 307 articles. I chose January and February of 1994 because 
key events took place in these two months that highlighted both the aid and humanitarian 
suffering involved in the crisis. In January, France called for NATO use of airstrikes and 
in February, the market place massacre takes place, leaving 68 dead and over 200 
wounded in Sarajevo. Moreover, it is the time period that best parallels the Libyan 
humanitarian crisis because it was during these two months NATO began airstrikes and 
mortality rates best paralleled those in Libya.78  
 The third and final data set, of newspaper articles reporting on Libya in 2011, 
were collected through the Lexis Nexis archives of the New York Times, Washington 
Post, and USA Today. I limited my search to articles published in March and April of 
2011 and that included the word Libya in the headline, which resulted in a data set of 233 
articles. I chose the months of March and April to maintain a manageable number of 
articles to analyze but also overlap with the time period in which the Libyan tweets were 
published. 
 The discourse analysis of these three different data sets required a thorough 
analysis of rhetoric, content, assumptions, ideas, and other forms of meaning production. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 Find timeline of Bosnian civil war at: 
http://www.mtholyoke.edu/~bonne20s/majorbattlesmaps.html. 
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Prior to reading the texts, I established four areas of discourse in which I thought the 
humanitarian narrative could be entrenched or challenged: representation of aid 
recipients, representation of aid providers, images of suffering, and representations of 
gender. I then conducted a full comprehensive reading of all the data in search of other 
areas of discourse, in which the narrative could be reinforced or challenged. Through a 
close reading of the texts, I noticed Libyan tweets were challenging the humanitarian 
narrative through the use of humor, which then gave rise to a fifth area of discourse. In 
the all-encompassing reading of the texts, I also tried to identify general trends. After the 
full read through, I did a more targeted discourse analysis where I closely analyzed the 
text surrounding key search terms that represented the five discourse areas. The key 
search terms included victim, Libyans, martyrs, NATO, aid, image, photo, pic, haha, lol, 
joke, gender, women and men. The same search terms were applied to both the Twitter 
data set and the newspaper article data sets. 
 The two texts in comparison, tweets and newspaper articles, are structurally 
different. Tweets are short messages, limited to 140 characters each, that individuals can 
broadcast through Twitter, an online social networking site and micro-blogging service. 
These tweets can also link to online photos, videos or articles. While all tweets are public, 
only Twitter users who have selected to “follow” a particular user will see that user’s 
messages on their man newsfeed. By contrast the newspaper articles are much lengthier, 
around 1,000-1,500 words and could be an opinion piece or basic news report. I am 
aware of these structural differences throughout the comparative analysis, though I found 
the only real meaningful consequence of this structural difference was the formality, or 
informality, in which the discourse was presented. Both forms of text express tone, 
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opinion, emotions, and rhetoric, debate with others, varied content, and other important 
elements of discursive analysis.  
Thus, the technological revolution and expanse of the Internet over the last twenty 
years has enabled me to construct a study that can apply constructivist theories of 
discourse, narrative, and the nature of normative contexts to real world representations of 
humanitarianism. I selected two comparable humanitarian crises, dating before and after 
the expanse of the Internet, and then used a systematic method to analyze the 
humanitarian discourse within the tweets and newspaper articles reporting on those 
crises. This study tests whether discourses of resistance are possible within the normative 
context of humanitarianism and if those discourses can transform humanitarianism from 
the bottom up.  
However, prior to analyzing the discourses surrounding the humanitarian crises in 
Bosnia and Libya, it is important to understand their historical and political contexts. The 
lack of two perfectly comparable humanitarian crises means it is especially important to 
be familiar with the historical and political contexts of each case study so as to take into 
account relevant differences between the two conflicts and make fair comparisons within 
the discourse analysis. Moreover, an effective interpretation of the texts requires an 
understanding of the context and position of the speaker. Finally, the dominant 
humanitarian narrative de-contextualizes the suffering, the fighting, as well as the 
identities of aid recipients, aid providers, and perpetrators, so it is important to highlight 
the overarching narratives from which they emerged. Thus, I will briefly outline the 
history, conflict, humanitarian need, and international response to both the Libyan and 
Bosnian conflicts. 
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Background: Bosnia-Herzegovina 1994 
 
 In the wake of Yugoslavia’s collapse, Marshal Josip Broz Tito, a Partisan leader, 
became prime minister of the new independent communist state, the Federal People’s 
Republic of Yugoslavia. In 1946, he divided Yugoslavia into six Republics, some more 
ethnically heterogeneous than others. These new boundaries, and the decentralization of 
government, began to foster the ethnic tensions that would erupt into civil war decades 
later. The geographical history of Bosnia and Herzegovina was key to its internal conflict 
and humanitarian crisis in the early 1990s.79 
 In the post war economic boom, Bosnia’s economy thrived as the epicenter of 
heavy industry.  “Bosnia’s rich mineral resources and an abundance of water made it an 
ideal location for heavy manufacturing… Bosnia saw rapid development in its mining, 
steel, aluminum, and hydroelectric power industries.”80 This economic development 
meant that by the 1990s, all production for the Yugoslav military, including weapons and 
munitions, happened in Bosnia, making it a key territory for the government of 
Yugoslavia.81 Moreover, as Bosnia’s economy grew, it became increasingly urbanized 
and ethnic groups were forced to mix. “By 1990 some 40% of Bosnian urban couples 
were ethnically mixed” and their children didn’t identify with any particular ethnicity.82 
However, this intermarriage was taking place mostly among non-Muslims. 83  The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 Robert Donia and John Fine, Bosnia and Hercegovina: A Tradition Betrayed (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1994): 162. 
80 Ibid., 173. 
81 Ibid., 174. 
82 Ibid., 186. 
83 Steven Burg and Paul Shoup, The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and 
International Intervention (New York: M.E. Sharp, 1999): 42 
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urbanization and wealth concentrated in Bosnia’s cities created a tension between the 
rural and the urban, which contributed to the Bosnian conflict in 1992 and 1993. 
 While Tito successfully maintained control for many years, Slovenia and Croatia 
grew angry in the late 1960s due to economic discrimination and unfair distribution of 
federal resources. Croatians began to make a list of grievances and claimed they “were 
under-represented in the Bosnian Party organization and in all major political, economic, 
and social bodies in the Bosnian republic.”84 Tito quickly intervened to stop the rise of 
this Croatian nationalist movement – thousands of protesters were imprisoned and pro-
Croatian publications were put to a stop or moved underground. However, in 1980 Tito 
died and there was no clear successor who could hold together the diverse regions of 
Yugoslavia.85 
 After Tito’s death, the economy took a turn for the worst and Yugoslavia’s central 
government institutions fell apart. In January 1990, the League of Communists of 
Yugoslavia failed to agree on a constitutional restructuring of Yugoslavia and the Party 
congress adjourned indefinitely.86 Each of the six republics held elections in 1990, but 
federal elections never took place. The tension between the Serbs and other ethnic groups 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina began to emerge.87 The Yugoslav People’s Army (YPA) 
changed its mission and became an agent fighting for Serbian Nationalism.88 Meanwhile, 
the 1991 war in Croatia was further strengthening nationalism among Bosnian Serbs. 89 
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In March 1992, a full-scale war emerged in Bosnia, with both Croat and Serb forces 
trying to gain Bosnian territory.  
The Serbs were much more powerful than any other ethnic group in Bosnia. “The 
YPA had about 90,000 troops in Bosnia: it controlled most armories and munitions 
stockpiles and could rely on over forty fighter planes, hundreds of tanks and heavy 
artillery, and many thousands more troops stationed in Serbia.”90 Bosnian forces were 
out-armed and out numbered. The Croats and Bosnians, both incapable of beating the 
Serbs alone, had a wary alliance through 1992 and the start of 1993, but then began 
fighting each other when the Owen-Vance Peace Plan gave certain Bosnian territories to 
the Croats.91 “The Croatian-Bosnian fighting in 1993 was among the war’s bitterest, 
accompanied by vicious campaigns of ethnic cleansing on both sides.”92 The YPA, 
fighting for the Serbs, was able to take over much of Bosnia within just weeks, including 
major land routes into the city of Sarajevo. Serbian forces would massacre Muslims and 
engage in mass artillery bombing of Bosnian cities.93  
Serbian paramilitary groups created a humanitarian crisis, which included mass 
rape, internment, and murder.94 Carpenter describes the process of Serbian attacks:   
Militiamen would begin by publicly torturing and executing the 
settlement's political and cultural elite. Of the remaining population, 
women, children, and the very old were typically permitted to flee or 
forcibly deported…Younger women were frequently singled out for 
rape… Able-bodied males between the ages of six- teen and sixty were 
sometimes also detained, usually to face torture, forced labor, and possibly 
death. However, adult males were instead frequently killed on the spot.95 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90 Ibid., 239. 
91 Ibid., 251. 
92 Ibid., 252. 
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The process of conquering territory and eliminating Bosnian Muslims was discriminate 
and highly systematic. By fall of 1992, there were over two million refugees fleeing 
Bosnia, which was about half of their total population in 1991.96 Amnesty International, 
the US State Department and the International Court of Justice stated that Serbia “has 
been the initiator and principal perpetrator of ethnic cleansing,” but the Croatian armed 
forces and Muslims have also committed atrocities in the name of ethnic cleansing.97  
The international response to the Bosnian crisis was originally slow. Europe was 
divided on which ethnic group to support98 and the US was hoping to avoid a costly and 
difficult intervention. The result was an approach of “containment through charity”, 
which meant “trying to bottle up as completely as possible all this suffering and death, 
and, in their wake, to contain the mass movements of refugees as completely as possible 
with borders of Croatia and… Bosnia-Herzegovina.”99 Aid organizations set up refugee 
camps and began airlifting supplies into Sarajevo. By 1993, the UNHCR was providing 
more than 2.7 millions of Bosnians aid, spending almost a million dollars a day.100 
Instead of taking a strategic military position to bring a halt to the violence, the US and 
European states hid behind the curtain of humanitarianism, and its principles of 
impartiality and neutrality, to avoid direct military intervention.  
Slowly, the UN and member states began to recognize humanitarian relief would 
not bring an end to the Bosnian conflict, and a more political intervention was needed. It 	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wasn’t until October of 1992 that the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 781 to 
enforce a no-fly zone over Bosnia. In addition to their humanitarian relief, airdrops, and 
refugee support, they established international mediation by the Owen-Vance and Owen-
Stoltenberg teams. They imposed economic sanctions against Yugoslavia and began 
creating war crime tribunals.101 Eventually, the peace process was handed over from 
Owen and Stoltenberg to the US and Russian diplomats. The US pressured the Tudjman 
regime and threatened UN sanctions against Croatia if it continued to arm Bosnian 
Croats.102 
In February 1994, the Serbs shelled a market place in downtown Sarajevo 
resulting in heavy causalities. The atrocity gained the attention of mass media and 
pressured the international community to take more immediate action in response to the 
Serbs. After the Sarajevo marketplace massacre, where 69 people were killed and 200 
others wounded, the US and France agreed NATO “should be prepared to employ air 
strikes against the Bosnian Serbs.” 103 Serbians tested NATO and used six aircrafts, 
violating the no-fly zone, to bomb a Bosnian government munitions factory. In response, 
NATO authorized US planes to take action and shoot down four Serbian aircrafts.104 As a 
s result, the Serbians began to view NATO’s threat as credible and started to cooperate. 
At this time there was also a NATO ultimatum demanding the Serbs withdraw heavy 
weaponry around Sarajevo, as well as EU’s new demand for an immediate lifting of the 
siege of Sarajevo, where Serbs had been blocking food and supplies from entering the 
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city.105 The Serbs cooperated with UN and NATO ultimatums and the violence came to a 
cease. Ceasefires were quickly arranged and, by March, the Croats and Bosnians ratified 
an agreement to unite in a federation and merge their forces into a single army once 
again.106  
The humanitarian crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina emerged from decades of 
complex ethnic tensions and a lack of centralized government. The violence that ensued 
led to the massacre, torture, rape and mass displacement of Bosnian civilians. In the first 
few years of the Bosnian war, the US and its allies relied on NGO and UN humanitarian 
aid to contain the crisis, so that they could avoid a costly military intervention. 
Eventually, the atrocities taking place forced the US, NATO and the UN to take action 
and help secure the region through military threats and negotiations. 
 
Background: Libya 2011 
The second case study of the 2011 Libyan Revolution should also be understood 
in terms of its complex political and historical context. In 1969, Muammar Gaddafi came 
to power in a coup to overthrow Mohammed Idris, a Sanusi leader who was accused of 
corruption, preferential treatment of Cyrenaica, and pandering to the West. At the 
beginning of Gaddafi’s rule, Americans were asked to leave Libyan military bases, 
corruption decreased, and oil was equitably distributed throughout the state.107 At first, 
religious criminal codes were reinstated - alcohol was banned, churches were closed, and 
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the Koran became a governing text, but Gaddafi soon adopted a new ideological position 
that put traditional Islamic conventions on the back burner.  
He published his new political ideology in three volumes of The Green Book and 
called it the Third International Theory, which, according to Gaddafi, is based on 
“religion and nationalism – any religion and any nationalism.” He claimed it was an 
international doctrine in support of those opposing the status quo whether or not they 
were in Libya or even the Arab World. Gaddafi took on an increasingly international role, 
funding revolutions and regimes throughout Africa and the Middle East. For example, in 
1977, Libya fought a four-day border war with Egypt and invaded Chad in support of 
rebel forces. He saw himself as “the king of African kings and the imam of Muslims,” 
leading the fight against the capitalist West and bringing power to the Arab world.108 
With its newfound identity and Gaddafi’s global reach, Libya was a fast rising power.109 
Its economy boomed without the help of any foreign loans. Women and blacks were 
given equal rights and welfare systems provided the public with free education and health 
care.110 
 However, many factions of Libya were skeptical of Gaddafi’s platform. Libyan 
patriots were angry with Gaddafi’s high spending on foreign involvements, while the 
religious establishment was furious with Gaddafi’s abandonment of religious 
orthodoxy. 111  In 1977, Gaddafi established “The Socialist People’s Libyan Arab 
Jamajiriyya,” which was suppose to function as a direct democracy, but instead just 
“concentrated power at the very top around Qadhafi, protected by a bevy of security 	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http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2011/09/20119493450743624.html. 
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110 Dirk Vandewalle, A History of Modern Libya, (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2012): 87. 
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apparatuses and informal groups.”112 Like many other oil states in the region, “the 
legitimacy of the Jamahiriyya remained intricately linked to the regime’s ability to 
provide a certain level of economic well-being to local citizens.”113 
 So in 1988, when the United Nations and US imposed economic sanctions on the 
Gaddafi regime for the Lockerbie bombing114 the Libyan economy began to crumble and 
resentment began to brew. Dirk Vandewalle explains: 
As the sanctions took hold, inflation soared, and the delivery of goods 
became erratic and unpredictable. The everyday lives of Libyans had 
become measurably more difficult… After three decades of centralization, 
of poor decision-making, of outright neglect, and of making economic 
development subject to the whims of revolutionary pursuits, Libya had 
developed intricate patterns of patronage that in effect constituted major 
political as well as economic liabilities…115 
 
In fear of losing power to the masses, the Jamahiriyya distanced itself from terrorist 
groups and turned over the names of those involved in the bombing. Gaddafi made a 
speech in support of US intervention in Afghanistan and tried to revamp Libya’s image in 
the international community.116  
 A decade later, mass protests, demanding a change in leadership and democratic 
representation, sprouted up in Tunisia and ignited what would become known as the Arab 
Spring – a wave of revolutionary movements throughout the Arab world, including 	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people including Americans. Gaddafi was also blamed for the 1986 bombing in a Berlin 
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Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Bahrain, and Syria, as well as major protests in Algeria, 
Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco and Sudan. While there had been longstanding democratic 
movements in many of these nations for some time, the Arab Spring was orchestrated by 
a younger, more tech savvy, generation. Phillip Howard describes the role of new 
communication technology in the Arab Spring: 
Social protests in the Arab world have spread across North Africa and the 
Middle East, largely because digital media allowed communities to realize 
that they shared grievances and because they nurtured transportable 
strategies for mobilizing against dictators117 
 
The Arab Spring fostered transnational networks across Africa and the Middle East in 
support of democracy and revolutionary movements, which in turn, pressured 
governments and NGOs to aid revolutionary movements abroad. 
Protests against human rights abuses, social program mismanagement, political 
corruption, and Gaddafi’s rule, erupted throughout Libya on February 15, 2011. On 
February 27th, the National Transitional Council (NTC) formed to coordinate 
revolutionary efforts. 118 Unlike the protests in Tunisia and Egypt, young, well-educated 
members of the middle class did not drive the Libyan Revolution. Instead, it was 
underemployed young men with less access to education and information technologies 
than their revolutionary counterparts. Also, while there were trade unions and labor 
movements in Egypt and Tunisia to pressure existing regimes to step down, there was no 
organized opposition in Libya until the armed rebels began to organize themselves.119  
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When revolutionary leadership finally came out of the woodwork, it was highly 
contentious. According to Wolfram Lacher, “The elitist nature of the revolutionary 
leadership and its detachment from the protest movement of the first weeks, as well as the 
rift between the northeastern elites and revolutionaries in Misrata or the Western 
Mountains, are obvious.”120 Lacher highlights the political tensions that emerged once 
success was in sight, but in its origins, the Libyan Revolution was a truly grassroots 
movement. Libya quickly moved from a state with no organized opposition to one with a 
mass opposition movement characterized by diverse interests, conflicting tribal loyalties 
and various social and political backgrounds. 
By March, the peaceful protests had turned into a bloody civil war between rebel 
groups and Gaddafi’s regime.121 Libya was soon divided into rebel and loyalist controlled 
territories, and the NTC prepared for combat. Maya Bhardwaj explains the militarization 
of the NTC:  
Arms trade and mercenaries from regional allies such as Qatar and 
transnational businesses created mass militarization that tipped the balance 
from peaceful protest to armed civil war.... The ensuing lack of 
government monopoly over violence thus crucially allowed the NTC to 
militarize to counter bloody loyalist crackdowns. Militia formation and 
exploitation of tribal arms access allowed forces united by grievances to 
functionally achieve violence rather than being immediately subdued by 
loyalist military and security troops.122 
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Transnational support aided the NTC militarization and prepared them to fight loyalist 
forces. The NTC took over Benghazi as their de facto capital and began to slowly 
advance toward Tripoli and the Gaddafi compound.123  
The humanitarian situation in Libya primarily consisted of violence against 
civilians and deprivation of basic supplies. There was a high death toll in just the first 
week of the crisis, which caught the international community’s attention. Human Rights 
Watch reported that over the first four days of the revolution, at least 233 people were 
killed. The Gaddafi regime was killing peaceful protesters and arresting political 
activists. According to the Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect, pro-Gaddafi forces 
used cluster munitions and targeted civilian areas. Throughout Libya, civilians were 
displaced due to the violence and shelling of cities. Many civilians, particularly women 
and children, became refugees and fled to Tunisia, Egypt or Chad to escape the conflict.  
Libyans also suffered from a shortage of basic supplies. Médecins Sans Frontières 
reported, “The delivery of supplies was heavily disrupted by the conflict resulting in 
shortages in water, fuel, food and medical supplies.”124 Finally, explosive remains in 
areas where there had been combat also posed a threat to peaceful civilians. 
Unlike the crisis in Bosnia, the international community intervened in Libya 
rather quickly – “freezing financial assets and imposing travel bans and sanctions.”125 As 
reports leaked out about the murder of peaceful protesters and Gaddafi’s promise to hunt 
down his enemies “from house to house, room to room, alley to alley,” 126  the 
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international community felt pressured to intervene.127 After the imposition of UN 
sanctions and an arms embargo, UN Security Resolution 1973 authorized enforcement of 
a no-fly zone over Libya and empowered member states to “take all necessary 
measures… to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack.” 
While the US led the enforcement of the no-fly zone at first, NATO soon took over.128 
NATO, including US forces, also provided military strategy, trained rebel fighters, and 
supplied the NTC with effective weaponry.129 
In March and April of 2011, the Libyan military and other state institutions 
quickly began to disintegrate or defect in the face of the uprising because individuals’ 
tribal loyalties130 took precedent over their loyalty to Gaddafi. Moreover, most state 
institutions were weak to begin with since so much power was centralized around 
Gaddafi and his surrounding family.131  The NATO no-fly zone, coupled with the 
continuous advance of armed and trained rebel fighters proved lethal for the Gaddafi 
regime. The history and political complexities of the Libyan revolution provides a 
framework for interpreting Libyans’ tweets. It enables us to see diverse Libyan identities, 
desires, beliefs and arguments in context of the larger narrative, so, as readers, we can re-
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contextualize and re-politicize the identities and conflicts that have been flattened by the 
dominant humanitarian narrative.  
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Chapter 4 
 
Libya and Bosnia: 
A Comparative Discourse Analysis of the Self and the Other 
 
The first step in this discourse analysis it to compare how Libyans represent 
themselves and the other, the non-Libyan aid providers, with how mass media represents 
itself, and its other, Libyan aid recipients. This discourse analysis is what Lene Hansen 
refers to as the discursive encounter: “rather than comparing Selves, the study contrasts 
the discourse of the Self with the Other’s ‘counter-construction of Self and Other.” 132 
She explains: 
 Most discourse analysis within and beyond International Relations has 
examined the construction of a national or regional, usually, Western or 
European, Self… These studies do not, however, address the discourses of 
the Other: how the Other constructs itself as well as the opposing ‘West.’ 
Studying discourses of both Self and Other… is significant in that it 
provides knowledge of the discursive and political room of maneuver of 
foreign policy issues.133 
 
The discourse analysis presented here focuses primarily on the discourse of the Other 
(Libyan tweets), but in comparison to discourses of the Self (mass media in Bosnia), so 
as to see how these discourses clash in the increasingly interconnected world of new 
communication technology. Therefore, I will compare trends within aid recipient 
discourse, as expressed through Libyan tweets in February through May of 2011, with 
mass media newspaper articles about Bosnia archived from January and February of 
1994.  
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Representation of Libyan Aid Recipients: From Victims to Martyrs 
 
 The first category of discourse analysis is the way aid recipients represent 
themselves. In order to understand how Libyans’ representation of aid recipients differs 
from the dominant humanitarian narrative’s representation, there must be a clear 
understanding of the latter. A key component of the traditional humanitarian narrative is 
the de-politicization of aid recipients; they are characterized as disconnected to the 
political conflicts that surround them – innocents whose sole desire is to live out their 
lives in peace. The humanitarian narrative frames aid recipients as a-political victims 
caught in the crossfire, instead of active agents of change, because humanitarian workers 
cannot be seen as fueling the conflict or supporting a particular side. Neutrality and 
impartiality are core principles of humanitarianism, which require the construction of an 
imaginary humanitarian space, independent of historical or political context.134  
Pierluigi Musarò argues that the humanitarian narrative forces actors to see 
humanitarian crises as arbitrary instances of mass suffering in a vacuum, removed from 
social, cultural, political or historical contexts. It is this framing of humanitarian crises 
that enables the de-politicization of aid recipients. 135 Aid organizations must approach 
the crisis through values of neutrality and impartiality; they must avoid blaming any party 
for the crisis so that they can maintain access to the area. Mariella Pandolfi argues the 
framing of the humanitarian space as an “emergency” and “depoliticized exception” 
characterizes humanitarian crises as unpredictable and detached from historical 
processes.  The crisis is framed as something as chaotic and inexplicable as a natural 
disaster – without specific causes or solutions. Thus, aid recipients’ voices are silenced 	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because they are understood as mere objects of suffering and not political agents within 
their own narrative.136 
 Therefore, if Libyan Twitter discourse is to challenge the dominant humanitarian 
narrative, it must re-politicize aid recipients. The tweets must demonstrate civilian 
engagement with the political conflict and blur the dividing line between the 
humanitarian and the political. The Libyan tweets accomplish this in two ways. First, 
Twitter provides Libyan aid recipients with a new avenue of political engagement that 
did not exist in 1994 during the Bosnian crisis. With the use of Twitter, Libyans can 
expose human rights abuses, organize protests and petitions, and provide essential 
intelligence to hacktivists137 and NATO forces. Second, through Twitter, Libyan aid 
recipients can broadcast their active resistance, like mass protests and the armed Libyan 
revolutionaries, to individuals, organizations and states throughout the world. Similar 
civilian protests and armed civilian groups existed during the Bosnia crisis, but did not 
get as much coverage through US mass media news sources. 
 
A.  Twitter: a New Opportunity for Aid Recipient Activism 
 Libyan’s tweets, especially early on in the conflict, exposed human rights abuses 
and acted as a catalyst for humanitarian intervention. For example, Almuktar exposed 
government violence against peaceful protestors through tweets like “20 killed after 
refusing to fire at protesters in Ras Lanouf earlier today #gaddaficrimes #Libya #Feb17” 	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and  “Clashes in Tripoli between protesters & Gaddafi forces, the protesters came out 
after the Magreb prayer & were faced by gunfire #Libya #Feb17.”138 Libyan users have a 
unique ability to expose human rights violations since they are there on the ground. By 
contrast, international media access was severely limited in Libya; news agencies had 
difficulty gaining entry in the country, as well as filming, once in Libya.139 The Libyans, 
on the ground, blending in with the mobs or protesters, could see it all and the military 
did not censor their behavior like they might have done had international media been 
there. For example, feb17libya tweeted a video of an ambulance opening fire on unarmed 
protestors.140 Moreover, such users can echo Human Rights Watch or UN reports of 
human rights violations within Libya so as to pressure outsiders to take action. For 
example, feb17libya also tweeted, “Human Rights Watch confirms #Gaddafi forces using 
cluster munitions on residential areas in #Misrata.”141  
Such reporting demonstrates that Libyan aid recipients are taking on a political 
role by exposing abuse and placing blame on specific parties. Additionally, reports of 
human rights violations supported intervention efforts. According to Omar Amer, a 
representative of the Libyan Youth Movement, “without social media, the global reaction 
to Libya would have been much softer, and very much delayed.”142 Libyans’ engagement 
in the politics of the conflict motivated other states and NGOs to get involved. The 
recipients’ use of social media attracted sources of aid, making the recipients key players 
in their own humanitarian relief. 	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However, new communication technologies can also provide civilians in an 
intrastate conflict with a more activist avenue of political participation. Social media 
makes it easier for civilians to organize mass protests. Jina Moore, describing the role of 
social media in the Arab Spring, states: 
 
Facebook pages blared protest plans. Photographs were uploaded to 
Flickr, a photo sharing website, and video clips were hoisted onto 
YouTube. Protestors mapped their uprisings, and the violence that 
followed, adapting their online cartography in real time to reports gathered 
by text message and Facebook updates. To say nothing of all the 
tweeting.143 
 
Twitter and other new communication technologies provide a method of mass 
communication and a way to build communities around a collective goal. 
For example, The Day of Rage, a major protest in Tripoli, gained traction through 
Twitter. Thanku4theAnger tweeted, “New additional Hashtag for Libya is #May17...  It's 
Tripoli's Day of Rage! MAKE IT TREND!”144 The date of the protest was spread 
throughout the Internet, making it near impossible for any Internet user to overlook. 
Twitter user OmarAlmoktar even tweeted a “protest mapf” so that all Libyans could find 
out where the nearest protests were taking place and participate.145 Moreover, Libyans 
living outside of Libya during the crisis used Twitter to organize protests abroad: 
Thanku4theAnger repeatedly tweeted, “Libyans Abroad! If you can, Organize a protest in 
front of your Libya embassy on MAY 17 in support of TRIPOLI's Day of Rage #FEB17 
#LIBYA.”146 Finally, Libyans used Twitter to collect signatures for various petitions. 
Libyansrevolt tweeted, “Sign petition to #Pfizer directors to help halt distribution of 	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Viagra to #Gaddafi troops” with a link to an online petition.147 Twitter enables mass 
collective action and thus gives power to unarmed civilians in humanitarian crises.  
The Libyan tweets also demonstrate how recipients can use Twitter not just as a 
political tool for activism, but as part of a military strategy. Aid recipients on Twitter 
became a source of military intelligence for NATO and rebel forces, as well as hacktivist 
groups like Anonymous. Many twitter users, either in Libya or in constant 
communication with those there, gained intelligence regarding important targets to 
weaken Gaddafi forces. For example, Twitter user Libyansrevolt tweeted, 
“25.925474,14.442065 Mercenaries camp @NATO @NATOpress @UKMilOps… via 
@moooonlight22” as well as the coordinates of a military supply center to attack.148 
Similarly, twitter user Thanku4theanger tweeted, “@NATO Situation Critical Grad 
launchers 32.3103488N 12.5724792E” and “@NATO Plz Recon 31° 57’ 6.74’’ N 12° 
19’ 3.84’’ E for G forces.”149 These Twitter users are not alone in providing NATO with 
key military intelligence to attack Gaddaffi forces. Storify, a social media tool to 
document social perspectives of historical events, includes a list of 100 different tweets 
sent to and used by NATO forces from Libyans on the ground or connected diaspora.150  
Most importantly, the Libyans spouting military intelligence were heard and their 
information contributed to the success of the NATO intervention. “NATO intelligence 
analyst are turning to Twitter, YouTube and other social Medial channels to help 
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determine potential targets for Libyan airstrikes – and to assess their success.”151 
Officials in NATO member states explained that online activity was being used as open 
source intelligence, and RAF Wing Commander Mike Bracken, the Libyan operation’s 
military spokesman, said that Twitter was one of the open sources to form a better 
understanding of the situation on the ground.”152 NATO forces and Libyan rebel groups 
receiving direction from NATO used intelligence provided by ordinary Libyan citizens 
watching the conflict unfold from their windows. Libyan aid recipients, and their friends 
and family abroad, played a critical role in their own protection. The line between soldier 
and innocent civilian was blurred, humanitarianism became inseparable from the political 
conflict, and Libyans were political agents. 
In regards to hacktivist attacks against Gaddafi forces, Libyan Twitter users again 
played a critical role. Almuktar tweeted, “The followin r websites wich gaddafi+his 
forces use 4 communications ie must be hacked:” followed by a URL link to a webpage 
with a long list of links to different Libyan websites.153 Libyans, in and outside of Libya, 
best know how the government spreads its propaganda or maintains order, thus they are 
best suited to provide hackers with online targets to weaken Gaddafi’s control over the 
Libyan people. Again, their voices were heard: all the parts of Gaddafi’s media empire 
including the website for the Libyan Revolution Committees Movement newspaper, New 
Libya TV, a radio station set up and owned by Sayf-al-Islam al-Qaddafi, Libyan’s 
satellite channel’s website and Facebook page, and Allibya.tv went offline, or were 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
151 Tim Bradshaw and James Blitz, “NATO draws on Twitter for Libya Strikes,” Washington 
Post, June 15, 2011. 
152 Ibid. 
153 Almuktar, March 21, 2011, 8:03pm. 
Noble	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  65	  
defaced, by various hacker groups including Anonymous and Ktkoti.154 Libyans on 
Twitter became ground soldiers for hacktivist groups around the world. They played a 
political role in taking down Gaddafi, even while they were in danger of being killed or 
running out of food and water. The “victim” and “soldier” identity existed 
simultaneously, complicating traditional understandings of humanitarianism. 
 
B. Twitter: a New Method to Broadcast Aid Recipient Activism 
The second way Libyans used Twitter to re-politicize Libyan aid recipients was 
by broadcasting their acts of civilian resistance throughout the Web. The humanitarian 
narrative depoliticizes aid recipients and thus mass media, operating within the normative 
context of the humanitarian narrative, fails to highlight acts of civilian resistance during 
humanitarian crises.  For example, despite there being protests and a large citizen army in 
Bosnia in 1994, mass media focused its lens on NATO’s efforts while characterizing aid 
recipients as non-political and passive. Libyans challenged this aspect of the 
humanitarian narrative because Libyan Twitter users highlighted civil resistance efforts 
like mass protests and advancements by rebel forces. 
Mass media sources characterized Bosnian aid recipients as passive and removed 
from their political context. For example, only one article within the entire Bosnia mass 
media data set mentions any public protests. The one article that does is from the 
Washington Post and refers to a demonstration of 300 Muslims near the central Bosnian 
village of Biljesevo. The article briefly reports that “the protesters were demanding food 
and objecting to what they said was inequitable distribution of aid. The police shot over 	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the heads of the demonstrators, and they dispersed.”155 The coverage of this protest 
reveals Bosnians begging for more aid without having any political opinion on the 
conflict itself. They are characterized as rather passive and weak based on the report of 
them immediately dispersing at the sound of gunfire. Moreover, images in the newspaper 
articles about Bosnia depicted Bosnians in passive forms, mainly crying or praying while 
on their knees.156 However, these articles and images misrepresent, or at least fail to 
show, the political interests and engagement of Bosnian Muslims.  
Bosnians were not removed from the politics that surrounded them, and were 
activists towards their own regional peace. For example, in 1993 there was a protest 
between 50,000 and 100,000 Bosnians, of all national groups, who came out on the 
streets to protest. One speaker at the protest articulated their demands: “Let all the Serb 
chauvinists go to Serbia and let the Croat chauvinists go to Croatia. We want to remain 
here together. We want to keep Bosnia as one.”157 The protesters faced constant rounds of 
automatic weapons fire.158 In addition, when the international community suggested 
Bosnians hand over Gorazde to the Karadzic Serbs in exchange for territory around 
Sarajevo, there was a wave of strong Bosnian protests and the negotiation quickly 
collapsed.159  
The Serbian civilians proactively engaged in the politics of the conflict as well, 
especially through anti-war campaigns. In 1993, about 1,500 Bosnian Serbs held a 	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massive demonstration in the streets of Belgrade, and were called traitors on Serbian 
television. Serbian civilians also organized a bi-monthly magazine called the Republika, 
and circulated leaflets, posters and advertisements “to mobilize against the war and send 
a message of solidarity to all those resisting it.”160 Moreover, many Bosnian Serbs 
protested by avoiding the draft. In 1993, 53,000-draft age Serbs from Bosnia and Croatia 
moved to Serbia, and the Bosnian Serb military courts had issued over 2,500 warrants for 
desertion. There was also a rebellion in Banja Luka where 1,000 soldiers took control of 
the town and demanded elections.161 Bosnians were an active and politically engaged 
people despite the media representations of them as mere victims, removed from 
historical and political contexts. 
Author Lene Hansen confirms the de-politicized narrative of aid recipients in the 
Balkan region. She argues the US and other NATO states needed to transform the 
“Balkan discourse” into “humanitarian responsibility discourse” and thus made a 
discursive move to “separate the ‘equal parties’ of the Balkan discourse into ‘Balkan 
leaders’ and ‘civilian victims’ and to take Western responsibility for the latter, while 
situating political responsibility exclusively with the uniform ‘Balkan leaders.’”162 This 
narrative enabled American and British governments to justify peacekeeping forces but 
not intervene militarily in support of the Bosnian government. She explains, “the 
construction of uniform ‘Balkan leaders’ read atrocities as ‘Balkan’ rather than as caused 
by a particular political or national group.”163 Thus, atrocities such as the massacres in 
Sarajevo, Tuzla, and Srebrenica were just a product of Balkan barbarism and not political 	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actions that demanded the international community to take a side. Most importantly 
though, this narrative of the humanitarian crisis in the Balkans depoliticized aid 
recipients: 
The ‘civilian victims’ were equally depoliticized in that they were 
constituted without political designations or history – a political history 
that might, again, have destabilized the construction of ‘all as equals’ and 
their protection as secured through Western peacekeeping rather than 
military intervention… The [humanitarian responsibility] discourse cannot 
ask how ‘victims’ have been produced without resorting to a depoliticized 
and dehistoricized Balkan identity.164 
 
Bosnian aid recipients, without a direct line of communication with the outside world, 
were shaped by the traditional humanitarian narrative, which stripped them of any 
political or historical identity. 
By contrast, the political activism of Libyan aid recipients received overwhelming 
coverage due to Libyans’ use of Twitter. The 2011 mass protests in Libya received 
coverage because Libyans spread photos, videos and constant updates regarding every 
protest within Libya’s borders. 165  Libyans broadcasted their mass protests against 
Gaddafi through “cell phones, tweets, emails and video clips – capable of quickly 
capturing and broadly transmitting eyewitness accounts of domestic developments to the 
rest of the world.”166 Libyans, with the power to communicate with the rest of the world, 
broadcasted their struggles in hopes of attracting the attention of the international 
community. All eleven twitter accounts tweeted pictures and updates about protests in 
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Libya and abroad. People throughout the world couldn’t use Twitter or Facebook without 
reading about the mass protests – a people’s movement – to combat the Gaddafi regime.  
Moreover, the Libyan tweets used rhetoric to characterize protesters as warriors, 
not mere civilians. For example, Libyansrevolt tweeted, “expecting further protests after 
Friday prayers tomorrow to be met brutally by regime. ‘We will win or we will die’ 
#libya #feb17.”167 His tweet characterizes protesters as individuals who are knowingly 
entering a war zone and willing to sacrifice their lives for a cause. The protesters are not 
surprised by a brutal attack – they are expecting it and are going out to protest with the 
aim of resisting government oppression and sacrificing their safety for something larger 
than themselves. This narrative of mass protests as a method of political activism is 
further entrenched by the use of the term “martyr” to describe civilians killed by 
government crackdowns on mass protests. Ten of the eleven Twitter accounts in the data 
set refer to fallen protesters, or even non-protesters caught in the crossfire, as martyrs 
instead of victims. Such a simple change in rhetoric quickly cultivates an activist identity 
for the Libyan aid recipients – politicizing them in the eyes of the international 
community and beyond.   
The discourse of aid recipients in Libya, as expressed through social media sites 
like Twitter, demonstrated their political engagement with the conflict and direct support 
for a particular side. Unlike mass media coverage of Bosnia, which failed to highlight any 
real aid recipient activism, Libyans used Twitter to position aid recipients within the 
political and historical context, and characterize the aid recipients as political activists, 
martyrs, and even soldiers. However, Libyan’s construction of the aid recipient identity is 
incomplete without an analysis of how they constructed the non-Libyan aid providers. 	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Aid recipients, just like the mass media, define themselves through the other, so their 
self-identity is reliant on how they represent aid providers including international forces. 
 
Representations of Aid: Fallen Knights in White Armor 
 
 Aid providers often steal the lead role in the humanitarian play. When the 
audience has seen enough images of malnourished children or shocking injuries, the 
photographer turns his lens toward the real protagonist. The aid workers, as well as 
international forces in cases of military intervention, are the saviors; they are risking their 
lives to save those in need. Media representations of humanitarianism elevate the aid 
providers and international forces to a god-like status. Such stories and photos tend to 
focus on doctors or soldiers, despite there being many more aid workers there for less 
glamorous tasks like sanitation.168 Moreover, the media focuses on international aid 
workers, instead of local domestic aid providers on the ground. In short, “the 
characterization of the humanitarian is that of the hero:  in this folk narrative, a 
glamorous image simply plays better.”169.   
However, the aid provider and aid recipient are mutually constitutive; each is 
defined through differences with the other. Thus, the more aid workers are characterized 
as powerful heroes, the further aid recipients are defined as helpless. Pierluigi Musarò 
places this dichotomy of giver and receiver within the larger context of geopolitics:  
Within the neoliberal capitalistic logic, the donor is a sort of a God who 
can, thanks to its own money, save the life of a whole African family. 
The contrast between the holy smile of the proud white actress and the 
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expression of waiting of the voiceless black family reproduce a particular 
social hierarchy: Humanity is split into victim and rescuer. 170 
 
According to Musarò, the “humanitarian as hero” metaphor is reflective of a much larger 
trend in international relations that goes beyond a specific humanitarian crisis. The same 
power dynamic and depiction of white saviors was, and is, seen in discourses of 
colonialism. 
 Within the news articles covering the 1994 humanitarian crisis in Bosnia, heroic 
representations of aid providers were easy to find. First, the photographs from the 
newspapers promote the hero narrative. In the New York Times, there was a photo of 
Ukrainian United Nations soldiers giving sandwiches to Sarajevo children171, while the 
Washington Post showed elderly residents standing in line at a Red Cross soup kitchen172. 
These photos emphasize the vulnerability of aid recipients by showing particularly 
vulnerable populations like the children and the elderly. Meanwhile, the UN and Red 
Cross are the one’s providing for the weak and bringing order to what would otherwise 
be chaos. 
Perhaps more powerful though, are the photos that manage to portray the power 
dynamic between the aid providers and recipients, as described by Musarò. For example, 
the New York Times published an image of a woman clinging to a United Nations 
ambulance that was evacuating her wounded husband from Sarajevo.173 Similarly, the 
Washington Post published a photo of a Muslim women pleading with a U.N. soldier to 
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take her out of East Mostrar after Bosnian Croat forces overtook it.174 Both photos 
demonstrate the aid recipient’s desperate dependence on the aid workers, while the 
providers of aid are shown as powerful characters in control of who will live and die. 
 Heroic representations of humanitarian workers and international forces elevate 
the ego and status of donor states and their citizens. Heroic representations of aid can 
help justify interventions and elicit additional aid because they make donor states, 
organizations and individuals feel good about themselves. Former Secretary of State, 
Warren Christopher, was quoted in the New York Times speaking on US intervention in 
Bosnia: “The fact that the United States is taking an active role is making a difference, 
because of our status in the world and our perceived ability, I feel a lot better.” 
Christopher admits he derives a sense of pride and comfort from US exceptionalism and 
its role as global policeman and global caretaker. James Dawes explains, “it is sometimes 
difficult to distinguish the desire to help others from the desire to amplify the self, to 
distinguish altruism from narcissism.”175 Representations of aid workers as infallible 
miracle workers empower donor states and individuals. 
 However, because we define ourselves through the other and the ways we differ 
from the other, the empowerment of donor states comes at the expense of the 
disempowerment of aid recipients. An article covering the Bosnia crisis in USAToday 
manages to portray the stark contrast between aid recipients and aid workers when it 
describes the status of Sarajevo: 
A severed head and arms and legs ripped from torsos by the explosion lay 
among the debris. People moaning with shock milled aimlessly among 	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rescue workers. Emergency room doctors, their white coats splattered with 
blood, yelled instructions as they rushed for gauze, medicines and 
bandages just delivered by foreign aid groups.176 
 
In the text above, aid recipients lack purpose as they “aimlessly” mill around rescue 
workers. They are suffering from too much pain and desperation to have real agency and 
are instead like zombies – out of touch with the political realities that surround them. 
Meanwhile, the doctors are organizing the chaos, doling out orders and saving lives with 
the new foreign aid supplies. “When victims are… reduced to the most basic of rights, to 
pure animal emotions, they become personless—they lose their human dignity.”177 Aid 
recipients are reduced to bare life – media representations strip them of dignity and 
agency so that the aid workers are seen as powerful and, most importantly, needed. 
 It is important to note that while these discourses are problematic, that does not 
mean they don’t reflect parts of reality. The scene in Sarajevo of aimlessly moaning 
victims and doctors with blood-splattered coats may be what the USAToday reporter 
saw, and the photos of aid recipients clinging to UN ambulances or begging at the feet of 
a UN soldier are real and should be shown. My criticism of the dominant humanitarian 
narrative is not that it in no way reflects aspects of reality, but that it uses selective 
observations to frame reality in a particular way, and the USAToday reporter likely saw 
and experienced the events in a particular way, as a result of the already established 
humanitarian narrative. While there are heroic acts of aid workers, there is a darker side 
as well. While providers of aid may sometimes save lives, that doesn’t mean they never 
fall short of their mission or make a mistake. And while some aid recipients may be so 
incapacitated by their circumstance that they can’t immediately take action, that doesn’t 	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mean they lack political agency or that there are no other recipients involved in aid 
efforts or a resistance. The shift in discourse that is needed to challenge the traditional 
humanitarian narrative is not the removal of humanitarian discourse. Rather, 
humanitarian discourse needs to be complicated – the multifaceted identities, 
relationships, and issues involved should be explored from all angles.  In 2011, Libyans 
began to do just that. 
  Tweets from Libyans during the humanitarian crisis of 2011 challenged 
traditional representations of aid by commanding, criticizing, and cautiously praising 
sources of aid relief, including humanitarian organizations and NATO. First, the Libyans’ 
made demands for aid instead of pleading for it. Almuktar proclaimed, “Humanitarian 
Aids MUST be dropped by air on Zawya…” and “World govs, UN must come out for 
aid”178 Similar rhetoric appeared in most of the Twitter accounts. Freetelw tweeted the 
hashtag, “#WhereIsNATO,”179 and Thanku4theanger tweeted, “NATO needs to get its 
ass to Yefren. You have the damn coordinates of Gaddafi forces positions for the love of 
GOD!”180 These demands stand in contrast to media coverage of Bosnia where aid 
recipients are portrayed as begging for help and headlines such as “Ivanisevic wins 
match; pleads for aid for Bosnia” are common.181 The distinction between a demand and 
a plea may seem like a small semantic difference, but it represents two radically different 
philosophies of humanitarian intervention: charity versus rights based humanitarianism. 
When aid recipients come hat in hand begging for help, humanitarian intervention 
is seen as a supererogatory moral act or gift, but the international community has no 	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obligation to intervene. By contrast, demands for aid demonstrate aid recipients are 
claiming a right to life and basic needs that they have by nature of being human, and that 
it is the responsibility of the international community to step forward and guarantee their 
human rights.182 The discourse parallels the UN discourse in the Responsibility to 
Respect doctrine, released in 2005, which claims states have a positive obligation to 
intervene and protect civilians outside of their territory under certain conditions. 
However, instead of coming from the UN, the discourse is emerging from the mouths of 
aid recipients and with much less ambiguity. 183  If such discourses that attribute 
obligations and responsibilities to donor states became naturalized, it could shift the way 
states respond to humanitarian crises.  
 Further challenging the traditional hero-victim narrative, Libyan aid recipients 
critically evaluated one of their own main sources of military aid, NATO. Almuktar 
tweeted, “NATO ha[s] failed 2 keep the NFZ [No Fly Zone]” and that “NATO is 
absolutely useless, instead of cutting G’s supplies its watching him get in reinforcements 
& allow him towards Bengazi&Ajdabya #Libya.”184 Twitter user, Libyanproud, also 
spoke out against NATO for not doing enough when he tweeted, “Power of #nato 
destroyed 2 tanks at best 8 today! All necessary measures my ass! #libya.”185 Finally, 
Tripolitanian took on the role of evaluator when he tweeted, “#NATO missed too many 
of their targets in #Tripoli last night – altho luckily no one was killed.”186 These 
criticisms of NATO deny heroic representations of international forces because they are 
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portrayed, at times, as cowardly or inept. Moreover, these Libyan aid recipients challenge 
the notion that recipients must treat these international forces as their perfect saviors in 
order to receive their support. Instead, aid recipients can challenge, critique and evaluate 
international forces coming to their aid, which elevates the recipients from the status of 
helpless and voiceless victims. 
 While Libyans challenged the traditional narrative by voicing criticisms of 
NATO, they were still thankful for the help they received. Their messages of thanks, 
however, avoided characterizing NATO as an infallible savior. For example, 
Libyanproud tweeted, “Maybe #NATO isn’t doing enough, but remember if it wasn’t 4 
coalition n then nato we wldnt be here ! Say thank u and then ask 4 more #libya.”187 On a 
similar note, he tweeted, “While I thank #nato for their efforts, I wish they wld take a 
faster approach 2 save #misratta #zintan #zuwara #sabha #alqilaa #azawiya #libya.”188 
While the Libyans recognize NATO’s sacrifice and is thankful for that, they also believe 
they deserve protection. With cautious appreciation, they manage to give thanks without 
bolstering the hero-victim narrative.  
 Libyans also challenged the traditional narrative by thanking internal sources of 
aid including their fellow Libyans working as doctors and police officers. For example, 
ChangeinLibya tweeted, “LET’S NOT forget the doctor rs that work 24/7 and see 
hundreds of cases in #Libya !! Thank you! #feb 17”189 along with a picture of two Libyan 
doctors performing surgery on an injured Libyan. When ChangeinLibya shows 
appreciation for Libyan doctors he is breaking apart the myth that Libyans are helpless in 
and unable to care for themselves. Instead, Libyans are actively saving lives alongside 	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NATO and coalition forces. The same Twitter user tweeted, “Benghazi’s police officers – 
first group to graduate post revolution #libya #feb17” along with a picture of dozens of 
Libyan police officers standing around their white police cars.190 This tweet demonstrates 
Libya is preparing for self-sufficiency and independence, which can help breakdown the 
narrative that outside forces will need to take on a paternal role post-revolution so that the 
state does not return to chaos. Such discourse emphasizing the state’s independence and 
growth can make it more difficult for donor states to justify exploitive post-intervention 
practices 
 Finally, Libyans expressed ownership of NATO and the coalition forces. 
Libyanproud tweeted “nato isn’t our liberator”191 as well as “The giants revolt, bani walid 
and tarhuna RISE ! Here comes our libyan NATO!”192 Libyanproud was aware the power 
dynamic NATO could create and wanted to let people know this was the people’s 
revolution – not NATO’s. However, instead of outright rejecting NATO or pretending it 
wasn’t helping – he rooted for the “libyan NATO.” He reframes NATO as something 
Libyan – or at least a product of Libyan’s efforts. This rhetoric turns the entire hero-
victim dynamic inside out by erasing any distinction between the two. In the same vein, 
Libyan tweets cheered on NATO: Libyansrevolt tweeted, “#Gadaffi Household: knock 
knock – who’s there? NATO B*****!”193 while Thanku4theAnger tweeted, “NATO on 
steroids tonight J.”194 The sense of humor and expressive enthusiasm demonstrate that 
the Libyans' appreciation is less like bowing to a savior and more like cheering on their 
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favorite football team. This sense of ownership of NATO forces helps equalize the power 
relations between the intervening forces and aid recipients. 
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Chapter 5 
 
Libya and Bosnia: A Comparative Discourse Analysis of Images, 
Humor and Gender 
 
 While the dominant humanitarian narrative centers on the relationship and 
interdependent identities of aid recipient and aid provider, there are other dimensions of 
humanitarian discourse that contribute to the hero-victim-villain storyline and perpetuate 
harmful stereotypes. In Chapter 5, I focus on images of suffering during humanitarian 
crises, aid recipient’s use of humor to combat the dominant hero-victim and 
representations of gender within the narrative. These all represent additional ways in 
which Libyan Twitter users could reinforce, challenge, or transform the dominant 
humanitarian narrative. I contend the Libyan Twitter users use disturbing images of 
suffering and strategic uses of sarcasm to disrupt and critique the dominant humanitarian 
narrative, but these users still reinforce harmful gender norms implicit within the 
dominant narrative.  
 
Images of Suffering: Disrupting Normative Understandings  
 
Visual images of humanitarian crises acquire meaning through normative 
contexts, but they also have the power to shape and transform normative understandings 
of suffering, conflict and the humanitarian enterprise. Comprehending an image requires 
imagining the story it reflects. When we look at an image “we construct mental 
representations – mental models – of settings, situations, and people, as well as the 
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relations among them.”195 Images are not passively received, but actively constructed 
through the viewers’ imagination and prior knowledge. Simultaneously, images 
contribute to individual understandings of the world. Images of humanitarian crises 
highlight some elements of suffering and suppress others in order to shape normative 
contexts, to frame “in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal 
interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation.”196 All images, even 
those that are quickly forgotten, “serve as a source of information that audience members 
can incorporate into their understanding of the story immediately at hand or a larger 
narrative presented across days, weeks, or years.”197 This means images can alter 
normative contexts because they can force a narrative onto a viewer that is inconsistent 
with the viewers original understanding. When this happens, the viewer alters their 
beliefs, values or larger understanding of the world so as to accommodate the new 
narrative in front of her. Of course, images can also reinforce our normative 
understandings and further entrench certain beliefs. Different visual portrayals of 
suffering form different narratives, which can reshape, or further entrench, normative 
contexts. 
Images of suffering have a unique influence on the construction of humanitarian 
narratives because they communicate “emotional information that is unlikely to be 
spoken or written by a reporter” or emotional information that is “impossible to 
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communicate in words.”198 Images can instantly communicate emotions through human 
faces and bodies. Rick Busselle explains, “We need no words to immediately interpret 
the sorrow on the face of a young woman standing over a flag-draped coffin. We 
immediately understand the desperation and anguish on the Sudanese mother’s face as 
she cradles her malnourished infant.”199 Images can be more powerful than text because 
“they appeal to our imagination, play on our feelings and rouse us from our complacency: 
in other words, images stir our conscience.”200 Of course, the message of the image can 
be clarified or further reinforced by captions that lead the viewer to see the image in a 
particular way. Humanitarianism, in particular, produces powerful images of intense 
emotions that tap deep into the viewers’ normative beliefs. Moreover, a photograph or 
video is better able to tell a story with characters, emotions, triumphs and losses, 
compared to text or quotes because the visual image sparks the viewer’s imagination. The 
viewer, upon seeing an image, constructs a narrative based on their own assumptions, 
inter-subjective norms and understanding of the people and place depicted in the image. 
“Images not only add to or define a narrative by referencing events, but also 
independently convey narratives by showing immediate expressions of 
experientiality.”201 Thus, images of suffering play a uniquely powerful role in the 
construction and deconstruction of humanitarian narratives. 
The blanket classification of “images of suffering” as vivid, emotionally laden 
and powerful fails to recognize the diverse reactions to the different ways death and 
suffering are displayed. John Newhagen argues that while there is a general assumption 	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that social turmoil, death and famine have the same powerful affect on viewers, this 
“strategy stops short of breaking down negative images into categories that might have 
discrete effects of their own.”202 Newhagen uses the approach-avoidance metaphor to 
explain different responses to emotionally evoking images of suffering. This metaphor 
applies the evolutionary fight or flight response to human reactions to images of 
suffering. Some portrayals of suffering, like those that tell a story or help the viewer 
relate to the subject of the image, may draw the viewer in emotionally and, in a way, 
attract the reader to see more suffering. Other portrayals of suffering, that make the 
viewer feel guilty, uncomfortable, or disturbed, trigger a flight response. Individuals 
might turn off the television at the sight of a disgusting image or turn away when an 
image provokes intense fear and discomfort. Of course, the categorization of images of 
suffering is not black and white. The important point made by Newhagen is that not all 
images of suffering are all the same, and different ways of portraying suffering and death 
can elicit different emotional reactions in the viewers. 
In the Washington Post and New York Times articles reporting on Bosnia, images 
of death and suffering highlight aid recipients’ feelings of fear and grief. Photos depict 
the injured being taken to hospitals, rows of dead bodies covered up in sheets203, and 
most often, Bosnians with sad or hopeless expressions. These pictures depict Bosnians 
struggling to complete their daily routines with expressions of despair 204 , often 
accompanied by a caption that explains the risk they take by just leaving the home. Many 
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others illustrate the grief felt by Bosnians through pictures of mourning mothers205 or 
tearful children. By contrast, in February of 2011, Twitter exploded with gruesome, 
disturbing images of bloodied faces and gun shot wounds. Libyans tweeted pictures of 
deformed faces206 and dead bodies laying in pools of blood on the sidewalk, as well as 
videos of “peaceful protestors torn to shreds”207 and “clean up crews in Misrata pick[ing] 
up decomposing bodies.”208 Other images show gaping wounds from high-caliber ammo 
allegedly used by African mercenaries. In sum, the videos and photos from Libyan’s 
Twitter accounts depict extreme bodily injuries and the actual firing of weapons. 
Both images from Libya in 2011 
and Bosnia in 1994 depict horrific 
images of suffering and death, but mass 
media photography of the Bosnian crisis 
shields readers from the more disturbing 
and grotesque images. Image A209 to the 
right depicts the bodies of the six 
children who died while playing in the snow.210 On January 22nd, 1994, shells exploded 
across a western Sarajevo neighborhood killing these six boys and wounding several 
others. This photo illustrates many elements of NYT and Washington Post photographs. 
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First, the bodies are covered in blankets, which is the case in many of the other mass 
media photographs. The blankets shield the viewer from the gore and horror. With the 
exception of blood on the second boy’s face, the children appear restfully sleeping. The 
reader knows they are dead but is not forced to directly confront that reality. The 
Washington Post depicted this same event, the shelling of six children, in an even more 
censored way. They published a photo of friends and relatives praying at a funeral for 
four Sarajevans, including “one of the six children killed while playing in the snow on 
Saturday.”211 Similarly, the New York Times covered the killing of the six children with a 
photo of neighbors walking past the park where the six children were playing when shells 
killed them. In the photo, the mother of one of the children and another women decorate 
the children’s sleds with flowers. These photos sanitize the deaths and shield the reader 
from the real horror of the event. 
What David Campbell calls the “disappearance of the dead” was evident 
throughout mainstream media coverage of Bosnia in 1994. At the time, BBC’s guidelines 
about which kind of images could or could not be shown “effectively prevented images 
capable of representing the nature and the extent of ethnic cleansing from making it to the 
screen.”212 Martin Bell, BBC’s principal correspondent in Bosnia, complained publicly 
about BBC’s censorship of “good taste” caused BBC to “prettify and sanitize the war.”213 
John Taylor explains how this is a systematic practice within mass media: 
The press errs on the side of caution in depicting death and destruction. 
It… uses the metonymic power of photographs to remove harm from flesh 
to objects. When the press decides to picture bodies, the imagery tends 
(with notable exceptions) to be restrained. Newspapers do not revolt 	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audiences for the sake of it. On the contrary, disgust forms a small part of 
the stock-in-trade and papers use it sparingly.214 
 
Mass media creates an aestheticized form of suffering for its readers. Mass media 
represents humanitarianism through distorted and censored images of suffering in Bosnia. 
This is consistent with the dominant humanitarian narrative because the viewers or aid 
providers are not forced to feel uncomfortable or guilty by grotesque images, but instead 
are given the opportunity to pity and feel sorry for aid recipients. Mass media maintains a 
positive image of the “Self” (or the aid providing population) within the humanitarian 
narrative. 
 David Campbell believes the disappearance of dead bodies from media coverage 
is dangerous because there is still a chance that pictures of graphic violence could be the 
basis for mobilization against atrocity and violence. “Bowing to the public pressure to be 
shielded from the pictorial representation of death, the media relies upon metaphoric and 
metonymic images which obscure the full nature and extent of horror… that might 
provoke a strong reaction.”215 However, Campbell is acutely aware that “how those 
photographs are used, and what contest is chosen in which to deploy them, is vitally 
important.”216 But in their absence, he notes, the harmful narratives and acts of atrocity 
have not ceased, so perhaps, “images of terror – used responsibly – can foster a climate in 
which terror is no longer tolerated.”217 Graphic and disturbing photos could be used as a 
method of resistance; they could challenge the dominant humanitarian narrative that 
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promotes a false understanding of suffering and mobilize actual support instead of 
fleeting sympathies. 
Unlike mass media portrayals of the 
crisis in Bosnia, Libyan aid recipients used 
Twitter to post raw and disturbing photos of 
the violence during the 2011 crisis. Twitter 
user Thanku4theAnger tweeted a link to a 
Facebook photo album, which included Image B, and wrote, “Graphic Fresh photos from 
Zintan hospital today taken only a short while ago.”218 Gruesome and bloody hospital 
photos were common throughout the tweets from Libyan aid recipients. Graphic videos 
also spread across the web through different avenues of social media. Twitter user and 
Libyan aid recipient(s), Feb17libya, tweeted links to several disturbing videos. For 
example, Feb17libya tweeted, “Infant in hospital Misrata injured by indiscriminate firing 
by #Gaddafi forces. (EXTREMELY Disturbing & Graphic) http://bit.ly/hOitY1.”219 
Gilbert Holleufer criticizes graphic images of suffering humanitarian victims, 
characterizing them as “an obscenity that tramples on human dignity.”220 This is a fair 
criticism since it’s easy to see how horrific images could reduce aid recipients to “bare 
life” and entrench the victim-identity prescribed by the dominant narrative. However, this 
argument is less persuasive when the aid recipients themselves are the ones tweeting 
images of their peers and sometimes themselves. Moreover, just because extreme 
suffering might be part of the aid recipient identity, does not mean that sufficiently 
characterizes their identity. Holleufer tries to avoid the victim “bare life” identity by 	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removing the horrific suffering from the narrative, but aid recipients could still challenge 
the dominant narrative by portraying their suffering as well as their political resistance 
and other facets of their identity within the humanitarian narrative. 
Another criticism of such graphic photos is that they will result in a form of 
compassion fatigue. The fear is that if the public is constantly exposed to horrific images 
of death and atrocity, they’ll become desensitized and the photos will no longer provoke 
their consciousness or inspire them to take action.221 However, David Campbell disagrees 
and argues that the compassion fatigue that does exist is not a result of horrific images 
but of the intersection of three economies: “the economy of indifference to others, the 
economy of ‘taste and decency’ whereby the media itself regulates the representation of 
death and atrocity, and the economy of display governing the details of an image’s 
production.”222 There are structural and economic constraints on the mass media industry, 
and these constraints lead to the censorship of suffering. Campbell argues that photos 
have the power to provoke and that the censorship of these photos “restricts the 
possibility for an ethical politics exercising responsibility in the face of crimes against 
humanity.”223   
Twitter is a method of producing and distributing images of suffering without 
being restricted by the economies Campbell discusses. Images shared through Twitter do 
not have to be in good taste or decent; there are no rules about how the image can be 
produced; and the Twitter user does not have to be concerned about whether the image 
will “sell”. Because Twitter is a form of citizen journalism, it does not have the same 	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barriers to accessing conflict zones or refugee camps. Twitter may be an avenue for 
photos of suffering to reach the masses, without restrictions and censorship imposed by 
the media industry. Images of suffering broadcasted through Twitter could radically 
provoke the public and foster ethical politics in response to humanitarian crises. 
Consistent with Campbell’s argument, these graphic images from Libyan Twitter 
users may be so disturbing that they shatter traditional normative contexts and challenge 
the world’s complacency in response to humanitarian crises. For example, Smith 
describes how Without Sanctuary, an exhibition of graphic lynching photographs, shakes 
individual’s basic understandings of the world:  
These images are not going softly into any artistic realm. Instead they send 
shock waves through the brain, implicating ever-larger chunks of 
American society and in many ways reaching up to the present... Horrific 
as they are, these photographs are a kind of gift, the gift of knowledge, the 
chance for greater consciousness and caring.224 
 
Much like the photos of the lynchings, the gruesome and disturbing images of suffering 
and death in Libya stun the viewer because there are images they are not exposed to 
through traditional media. The images from Libya cross a threshold of extreme suffering 
that makes viewers uncomfortable; the images show people worse things than they could 
ever imagine. Most of our normative contexts are not prepared to explain a man’s gut 
lying next to him on the street. These images force people to alter their understanding of 
the humanitarian conflict and pay attention as opposed to the traditional representations 
of suffering that only draw readers’ sympathy momentarily. 
 These disruptive images also challenge the dominant humanitarian narrative by 
altering the relationship between readers and images of suffering. Ignatieff explains the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
224 Robert Smith, "An Ugly Legacy Lives on, Its Glare Unsoftened by Age,” New York Times, 
January 13, 2000. 
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humanitarian narrative “creates sentimental stories that by making viewers feel pity also, 
and not accidentally, makes them feel better about themselves.”225 According to him, the 
dominant humanitarian narrative turns moral and political narratives into entertainment 
and drama.226 Instead of focusing on the political context or actors that are causing the 
suffering, the media focuses on small stories of tragedy or miracles to keep the audience 
entertained without tackling the controversial debates surrounding the crisis. In part, the 
dominant narrative is designed to make people in donor states feel good about them 
selves and enjoy watching the drama unfold in front of them. However, the gruesome 
photos and bloody videos, tweeted from Libyan aid recipients, challenge this narrative 
because they do not shield their audience from grotesque and disturbing images. They 
interrupt the appeal of the humanitarian narrative because the photos are more likely to be 
sickening and scarring than appealing and intriguing. The donors’ attraction to images of 
suffering inherent in the dominant humanitarian narrative is removed, and viewers are put 
in an uncomfortable position in which they must confront the realities of the conflict and 
their role in relation to the suffering on the page. 
 A common fear of promoting grotesque images of suffering and death is that such 
images deter readers from looking at or engaging with images of suffering, further 
separating them from the suffering subjects. However, it is not horrific images that 
distance the viewer from the suffering; it is the context in which the photos are presented. 
Sonia Sontag, in her later book on the power of photography, disavows her earlier 
argument about the harms of media saturated with images of suffering and admits that 
photos of suffering can have a powerful effect if used in the right context. “People don’t 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
225 Ignatieff, “Television and Humanitarian Aid,” 294. 
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become inured to what they are shown—if that is the right way to describe what 
happens—because of the quantity of images dumped on them. It is passivity that dulls 
feeling.”227 Sontag believes that people don not turn off the TV when confronted with 
gruesome photos or nonstop images of suffering; they turn off the TV because the photos 
are presented in the context of an “intractable and irresolvable situation.” TV viewers just 
see endless suffering and nothing they can to do stop it. When the conflict is portrayed as 
inevitable or irresolvable, they feel powerless, and are turned off by the suffering. Thus 
gore for the sake of gore may not grab the lasting attention of the public, but if the 
disturbing images are part of a campaign – if they call for specific, attainable and 
potentially effective action that will put an end to the suffering – viewers will see the 
disruptive images in a new way. If gruesome and disturbing images of suffering are 
shared within an activist context, they will not stifle communication between aid 
recipients and the rest of the world. 
The raw gruesome photos from Libya take place in a context of political activism, 
because they are part of a grassroots effort to attract US military support and expose the 
realities of the humanitarian crisis. Sarah Joseph argues that Libyans used Twitter blogs 
and other forms of social media to expose their government’s violent crackdowns on 
peaceful protests. She credits the quick transitions in Libya – from protests to civil war to 
international war – to the magnitude and fast-paced sharing of information through social 
media sources which mobilized global awareness and support.228 Aid recipients are 
acutely aware that military support depends on how they sell the crisis. If they can 
demonstrate that the government is slaughtering civilians in the streets, the US 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
227 Sonia Sontag, Regarding the Pain of Others, (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 2002): 102. 
228 Sarah Joseph, “Social Media, Political Change, and Human Rights,” Boston College 
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government, as well as NGOs and other states, may experience both internal and external 
pressure to take action and come to their aid. Yusra Tekbali, a Libyan woman, explains 
that Libyans are acutely aware of the power of social media: “There's a gruesome 
video… on Facebook, where one man is shot in the face, while his friend records and 
yells ‘Record it, Record this martyr. Show Al Jazeera.’”229 Many of the Libyans tweeting 
repeatedly described their role in the revolution as getting out information and pictures so 
the rest of the world could come to Libya’s aid.230 The context in which the disruptive 
images of suffering are produced is one of mobilization and political action, and therefore 
is able to harness to power of disruptive gruesome imagery in such a way that challenges 
the dominant humanitarian narrative without alienating readers and donor states.  
Images of suffering become weapons for Libyans to challenge the dominant 
humanitarian narrative. The images disrupt the normative context of humanitarianism and 
distort our traditional understandings. Similarly, Libyan’s use of humor is a method to 
disrupt and distort the narrative. The Libyan Twitter users use humor in ways that force 
us to question the humanitarian narrative we are so familiar with.  
 
 
The Use of Humor: Deconstructing the Humanitarian Narrative 
 
 The tweets from Libyan aid recipients are filled with jokes, snarky comments, 
humorous self-deprecation and satire. Satirical images and videos characterize the 
infamous Muammar Gaddafi, former ruler of the Libyan Arab Republic, as a pathetic 
fool. Simultaneously, Libyan Twitter users see humor in their own revolutionary 
movement, poking fun at their attempts to communicate in code and their own obsession 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
229 Justin Kaufmann, “A first-hand account of fleeing Libya,” City Room Blog, Feb. 27, 2011. 
http://www.wbez.org/blog/city-room-blog/2011-02-27/first-hand-account-fleeing-libya-83066. 
230 Feb17Libya, Twitter account description, https://twitter.com/feb17libya. 
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with Twitter. In addition, their satire often takes the form of parodies of western cultural 
phenomena. For example, Gaddafi is ridiculed in parodies of Gene Kelly’s “Singing the 
Rain,”231 Rihanna’s “Umbrella,”232 and the introduction to the 1970s American sitcom, 
The Brady Bunch.233 By contrast, the newspaper articles reporting on Bosnia are void of 
any humor. Such newspapers may have sparingly used humor in reporting on other 
subject areas, but they kept the conversation serious when discussing the humanitarian 
crisis in Bosnia and Herzgovina.  
Of course, this discrepancy between humor in aid recipient tweets and major 
American newspapers is expected and appropriate. The use of humor by mass media 
sources would be seen as making light of an egregious atrocity. Meanwhile, aid recipients 
are less vulnerable to such criticism because they are the ones suffering. They are the 
ones experiencing the humanitarian crisis, so they can use humor without anyone 
doubting that they are making light of a serious situation. I do not intend to make a 
normative claim about how mass media sources should report on atrocities. Rather, I 
hope to highlight how this new form of humorous discourse through aid recipient tweets, 
challenges the traditional humanitarian narrative. 
According to Anne Orford, the traditional humanitarian narrative characterizes aid 
recipients as passive weak victims, lacking power, agency and authority, who suffer at 
the hands of bullies and tyrants.234 The depiction of them as weak and helpless, in turn, 
characterizes the oppressor, as well as sources of aid, as powerful and dominating, though 
in different ways. This power dynamic reinforces the disempowerment and oppression of 	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233 Feb17libya, April 27, 2011, 2:49am. 
234 Orford, Reading Humanitarian, 171. 
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aid recipients. Recipients are characterized as passive actors incapable of resisting 
oppression and in need of rescue. According to Althussers’ theory of interpellation,235 aid 
recipients may begin to accept or internalize the passivity and helplessness that the 
dominant narrative ascribes to them.  
However, the process of interpellation, as a result of the dominant humanitarian 
narrative, can be interrupted and resisted through satiric and subversive criticism.  Judith 
Butler argues there are many ways to resist interpellation without taking up arms. She 
asks us to “‘consider the range of disobedience that such interpellating law might 
produce,’ such as refusal, parody or rupture.”236 When Butler claims there is a “slippage 
between discursive command its appropriated effect,”237 she is arguing that there is an 
opportunity to resist the dominant discourses; satire can disrupt the normative 
assumptions and prescriptions of identities embedded within the dominant narrative. The 
Libyans’ use of Twitter is a form of guerilla communication that challenges the power 
relations represented in the traditional humanitarian narrative. Guerilla communication, 
which aims to disrupt dominant discourses, “doesn't aim to destroy the codes and signs of 
power and control, but to distort and disfigure their meanings as a means of counteracting 
the omnipotent prattling of power… to detourn and subvert the messages transported.”238 
In a way, guerilla communication uses the dominant discourse as a tool to criticize the 
normative structures the discourse normally entrenches. 
The use of humor, through satire, self-deprecation, and parodies of western 
cultural phenomenon, challenges the prescribed identities and power relationships 	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imposed by the traditional humanitarian narrative. First, I will analyze how Twitter users 
use satire to laugh at their oppressors and therefore subvert traditional power structures of 
humanitarian discourse. Next, I will highlight how Libyans laugh at themselves, which 
portrays a complex identity instead of static victimization and forces a public reaction 
beyond mere sympathy. Finally, I will explain how Libyan tweets use Western cultural 
phenomena as a medium for their satirical attacks against Gaddafi, which blurs the 
distinction between the citizens within donor states and the recipients within the 
humanitarian narrative. 
 Libyan Twitter users laugh at their oppressor, which empowers them as active 
political agents capable of understanding and resisting sources of oppression. For 
example user Almuktar tweeted, “LOL239, Gaddafi TV has claimed protests in London 
against gov cuts r actualy against the coalitions no fly zone enforced on gaddafi 
#Libya.”240 Similarly, he tweeted, “Gaddafi claimed in his speech yesterday that coalition 
missiles which tageted his Air bases were a bunch of fireworks haha J.”241 His 
statements, despite the misspellings and emoticons, are powerful political weapons. 
Almuktar and many other users are poking fun at Gaddafi and laughing at his 
desperation. This lampooning of Gaddafi is a form of resistance because “to laugh at the 
literal behavior of other characters in the social drama, is to change the truth value of 
what those characters do so as to undermine its seriousness, its claim to veracity, to 
authority, and so to call it into question.”242  
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 Moreover, jokes can be used to humiliate and thus further deride the authority of 
persons. Almuktar undermined the authority and dignity of leaders in the Gaddafi regime 
when he tweeted, “Gbagbos gone, thats one down and 3 to go, get your clothes on guys, 
you dont want to be caught in ur underwear do u ? #Libya #Feb17 J.”243 In addition, 
almost all of the Twitter users made fun of Gaddafi’s televised speeches while in hiding. 
They tweeted things such as “The mad dog rants again ‘the US UK and France will all be 
defeated’ haha,”244 “That guys is an absolute fool speaking nonsense..lol,”245 and “is he 
reading that book in braille?”246 Laughter delegitimizes authority and characterizes aid 
recipients as empowered political agents who are able to see through the government’s 
tricks to maintain political stability and brave enough to resist and ridicule the source of 
oppression. It turns the power relationships assumed in the traditional humanitarian 
narrative inside out: aid recipients are the strong and tactical ones, while the oppressive 
regime is weak and pathetic. Not only are the tweets a form of resistance against the 
Gaddafi regime, but they are also, intentionally or not, a form of resistance against aid 
recipient identities prescribed by the traditional humanitarian narrative. Laughter is a 
powerful weapon against traditional normative contexts because “laughter breaks up, 
breaks out, splashes over…”247 
 Finally, a particularly peculiar form of satire making fun of Gaddafi was in the 
form of a YouTube video tweeted by IbnLibyafree248. The video entitled, “Angry Tweets 
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Presents Three Big Pigs,”249 is a bizarre combination of the popular iphone application 
game “Angry Birds,” in which users flick birds across their screen to knock out pigs, and 
the classic childhood story, “The Three Little Pigs and the Big Bad Wolf.” The video 
shows the angry birds flying through the air trying to take out the pigs, which look like 
the ex-president of Tunisia, Ben Ali, ex-president of Egypt, Mubarak, and finally Libyan 
leader Gaddafi. The video alters the appearance of totalitarian leaders by depicting them 
as small green pigs with squeaky voices. The angry birds, representing aid recipients, 
attack as a mob and effectively defeat the first two pigs, but struggle to break through 
Gaddafi’s shield of black umbrellas. After several failed attempts, a massive bald eagle, 
representing US intervention, destroys Gaddafi. The “level completed” sign then appears 
with a message that says “Stuck on a tricky level? Out of levels to play? Bring on THE 
MIGHTY EAGLE!”250 
 The video tells the story of humanitarian intervention but its absurd and satirical 
content transforms the classic story of the all-powerful US saviors into a more dark and 
complex comment on humanitarianism. The video’s use of satire, strange metaphors and 
bizarre imagery forms a subtle critique of the traditional humanitarian narrative. V. Vale 
and A. Juno explain: 
Pranks are most admirable when they evoke a liberation of 
expression...and challenge the authority of appearances. While almost all 
pranks mock or undermine kneel-to-authority conditioning, some do more, 
by virtue of disclosing more levels of black humor and metaphor, or 
expanding our notions of reality by gifting us with a bizarre image or 
metamorphosis. At a single stroke a prank can dissect an intricate tissue of 
artifice, exposing a rigid behavioral structure underneath.251 
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250 Ibid. 
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The humor and absurdity of the video sends the message that “this is play” and thus 
"these actions in which we now engage, do not denote what those actions for which they 
stand would denote."252 In other words, "these actions do not mean what they would 
mean if they were serious."253 Instead, the satire is a meta-message designed  “partly to 
negate, undermine, distort, the meaning of the behavior referred to.”254 In short, the 
video’s satirical representation of the traditional humanitarian narrative is actually a 
subtle critique of the traditional narrative itself. 
 The video turns the humanitarian narrative, which is widely recognized as 
legitimate and an accurate representation of identities during humanitarian crises, into a 
joke. The humanitarian narrative, when summed up in a three-minute video, seems 
ridiculous. We’re forced to laugh at the representation of the evil and threatening villain 
since it’s green pig with a squeaky, non-threatening, voice. The aid recipients are 
displayed as a mindless mob trying to take down the villain but constantly failing. This 
simplistic representation of aid recipients highlights the absurdity of many people’s 
actual assumption that aid recipients are just weak mobs of mindless rebels throughout 
the regions of the Arab Spring. Finally, the representation of the US as the giant eagle 
that can easily be called on to come take down the villain in one fell swoop also reflects 
our traditional views of humanitarianism, but in a way that shows us the inaccuracy and 
absurdity of those views; we’re forced to see how silly it is to assume the US can just 
easily be called on and immediately fix the conflict. The video exaggerates the 
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humanitarian narrative so as to show us its flaws and force us to laugh at it, thus 
delegitimizing it. 
 While the Libyan Twitter users made many satirical comments about Gaddafi and 
even US aid, they also made fun of themselves. For example, during the Libyan crisis, 
#YouKnowYourArab emerged as a trending hashtag.255 Twitter users were tweeting 
phrases like “#YouKnowYourArab when you’re ready to die for democracy J” so as to 
unify around the Arab Spring. This trend quickly expanded beyond revolutionary 
sentiments and users began to talk about Arab speaking patterns and tea choices. 
Eventually Tripolitanian jokingly tweeted, “Arabs are trying to work on free speech, 
which is why we'll say #YouKnowYourArab not #YouKnowYou'reArab #democracy.”256 
Likewise, twitter user Thanku4theanger tweeted, “Asked friend Tripoli where the 
weddings were (code for clashes), & they replied in the wedding venues? James Bond 
they're not J.”257 Thanku4theanger was making fun of the average Libyan citizens’ 
attempts at engaging in revolutionary tactics like the secret communication of 
intelligence. Additionally, Libyanproud laughed at the widespread attention on Libya’s 
internal conflict when he/she tweeted, “The ICC press conference will also be shown on 
jazeera sports 1,2,3 and on HBO, libyas biggest sporting event! J.”258 Despite the deaths 
and constant violence that took place during the Libyan crisis, these aid recipients were 
still able to laugh at the less dark parts of the crisis, including their own resistance efforts. 
 The aid recipients’ humorous self-deprecation challenges the traditional 
humanitarian narrative in two ways. First, humorous self-deprecation reflects the 	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recipients’ complex identities, challenging the abstract and flat identity prescribed to 
them by the traditional narrative. In the humanitarian narrative, “victims are represented 
in abstract terms,”259 but tweets in which Libyans are poking fun at themselves reflect 
character, a sense of humor, and self-awareness that the traditional narrative fails to 
capture. Representations of aid recipients as not mere victims but instead people with 
personalities, ideas, and wit, shatter stereotypical generalizations of aid recipients and 
force the world to see them as autonomous agents.  
Second, humorous self-deprecation does not further victimize the aid recipients 
like mere self-deprecation would, but instead unifies and strengthens the aid recipient 
community. When aid recipients make fun of one another, they are not tearing each other 
down but actually building each other up.  “Play fighting is not real fighting, the ‘nip’ is 
not the ‘bite,’ as Bateson remarks, though it uses identifiable aspects of the bite as an 
abstract sign indicating a meta-communicative bond, an understanding, between the 
players.”260 Thus, when a Libyan tweets a message making fun of other Libyans’ 
ineptitude they are not entrenching the traditional narratives’ characterization of 
recipients as helpless or weak. Because the message is satirical, it is not understood as a 
genuine criticism and, in fact, helps unify the aid recipient community because playful 
banter communicates a common understanding of shared-experiences. 
 Finally, Libyans’ tweets of satirical parodies that critique Gaddafi through 
western popular culture blur the distinction between the recipient and the donor with 
traditional humanitarian narrative. Twitter user, Dmgariany, tweeted a youtube video, 
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“I’m Killing in the Rain.”261 The video shows Gaddafi sitting in his car with door open 
and holding an umbrella over his head for an unusually long period of time. Meanwhile, 
there is a voiceover of someone imitating Gaddafi singing the song “I’m Singing in the 
Rain,” from the 1952 American musical comedy film starring Gene Kelly. The lyrics are 
slightly altered so that Gaddafi is singing about killing his people. Similarly, 
Libyansrevolt tweeted, “No time for jokes but: Gaddafi under his umbrella... ella... 
ella....” along with a video of the same scene of Gaddafi with an umbrella but to the tune 
of Rihanna’s hit single, “Umbrella.”262 Clips of Rihanna’s music video are mixed in with 
the video so that Rihanna’s pop star appearance juxtaposes Gadaffi’s less refined 
appearance. In addition, Feb17Libya tweeted, “The #Gaddafi Bunch -- Marsha Marsha 
Marsha” with a link to a picture of Gaddafi family members in the well-known opening 
sequence of the 1970s American sitcom, The Brady Bunch.263 These many references to 
American culture are likely because these songs and movies have seeped into Libyan 
culture. However, intentional or not, such playful parodies may lead Americans to feel a 
stronger cultural bond with aid recipients. This challenges the dominant humanitarian 
narrative because it blurs the distinction between the self and the other, the recipients and 
providers (as well as citizens of provider states).  
When aid recipients use American culture as a vehicle of communication, it 
erodes the difference between the aid recipients and donor state citizens. Anne Orford 
argues that the boundaries between the self and other are key to the humanitarian 
narrative. There must be a distance from the other so that the self can gain comfort and 
solace in the fact that they are unlike the other. Orford explains: 	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At stake in any representation of humanitarian crises and mass suffering is 
the self-image of the Western state, and now the international community, 
as sovereign, civilized, autonomous, powerful and humane. This self-
constitution depends upon establishing a narrative in which the chaotic 
other is separate from the heroic self.264 
 
The heroic self is defined in contrast to the other; the fact that the aid recipients are so 
different and alien to those individuals in the donor state is what uplifts donor state 
individuals and makes them feel powerful, humane and autonomous. The Libyans’ use of 
American culture to speak out about the humanitarian crisis makes it more difficult for 
individuals in donor states to see a concrete distinction between themselves and the 
Libyan aid recipients. When Libyans are touting the same cultural values as the 
Americans it is more difficult for Americans to see the other as chaotic or incapable, and 
thus the Americans cannot in turn identify themselves as the powerful heroes. The 
satirical parodies tap into cultural bonds and shared experiences, thus obscuring 
distinctions between aid recipients and donor state citizens and deconstructing their 
interdependent identities imposed by the traditional narrative. Thus, Libyans’ satirical use 
of western culture to communicate with the global community challenges the traditional 
normative context of humanitarian crises. 
 The use of images of suffering and humor were both tools to disrupt the 
humanitarian narrative. Libyan Twitter users could also challenge the dominant hero-
victim narrative, which is riddled with gender stereotypes, by challenging traditional 
representations of women in times of conflict. By contrast, the Twitter users could 
reinforce the narrative by entrenching the gender roles that are embedded within the 
dominant humanitarian narrative. Thus, in order to evaluate all the ways Libyans could 
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use Twitter to challenge or reinforce the dominant humanitarian narrative, it is important 
to analyze the way their Twitter discourse represents women, and as a result, men. 
 
Representations of Gender 
 
At first glance, the Libyan tweets seem to challenge gender norms within the 
dominant humanitarian narrative by empowering women as revolutionaries instead of 
mere receivers of aid. Thanku4theanger tweeted about women protests in Tripoli and 
Misrata. He tweeted, “Women protest taking place in #Misrata right now. Literally 
haven’t stopped chanting for a second for almost an hour now.”265 Tripolitanian and 
Feb17Libya also tweeted about numerous women’s protests.266 However, as established 
in earlier sections, aid recipients were empowered through Twitter discourse. Thus, we 
must try to tease apart empowerment of women as a result of the empowerment of all aid 
recipients versus empowerment of women as a result of a conscious deconstruction of 
gender norms. Deeper analysis of the tweets from Libyans demonstrates that the role of 
women in the revolution still reflects the gender norms and stereotypes found in the 
dominant humanitarian narrative. 
Gender norms are deeply embedded with the humanitarian narrative. According 
to Ann Orford, humanitarianism, and international law as a whole, is often understood as 
a way to compensate for women’s weakness. “As women are weak and the likely targets 
for violence, the role of international law and international lawyers is to protect them.”267 
Women are constructed as weak, passive and in need of protection within the 
humanitarian narrative, or in other words, women have a hyper-victim identity compared 	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to male aid recipients. Women are associated with child-like characteristics and often 
placed in the same category of children in terms of vulnerability and dependency. Gender 
norms perpetuate the idea that men are to protect women, which simultaneously 
characterizes the men as the fighters and the women as the passive victims. This gender 
norm manifests in humanitarian policy so that adult women are presumed “civilian,” 
while adult men are presumed, “combatants.” Humanitarian discourse reinforces this 
gender norm by using terms like “women and children” interchangeably with “aid 
recipients”. 
Charlie Carpenter explains, “Gender ideas are embedded in both the category 
‘innocent civilian’ and the category ‘especially vulnerable.’ These ideas exert constitutive 
effects on the discourse and regulative effects on the behavior of actors within the 
network.”268 Carpenter believes we have come to understand notions of innocent civilians 
or vulnerability through gender and associate those concepts with femininity.  While 
international humanitarian aid agencies try to be neutral in their distribution of aid, most 
have policies to prioritize the protection of the “especially vulnerable” when there are 
limited resources. Despite overwhelming evidence that adult and adolescent men are 
most likely to be massacred, since they are potential soldiers, the vulnerable populations 
that aid organizations prioritize tend to be women and children.269  
Bosnia is an example of this discriminatory distribution of aid based on gender. 
While women and children were more vulnerable to certain forms of violence, like rape 	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or sexual abuse, Carpenter argues they were less vulnerable to lethal attacks. When Serbs 
attacked a city, men were usually killed immediately, while women, children and the 
elderly were forced to relocate.270 In April 1993, the UNHCR preemptively evacuated 
thousands of women and children from Srebrenica but left the non-wounded men behind. 
Two years later, when the town was finally taken, the Bosnian Serb Army killed 8,000 
men including many who had never been soldiers and who had no gender-based 
advantage at survival when faced with indiscriminate shelling.271 In December 1993, a 
UNHC field report described the UN’s responsibility to protect the most vulnerable 
populations without specifying gender as a factor, but when aid organizations began 
evacuations, it was almost entirely women and children. “Of the 18,000 missing persons 
after the wars, the ICRC estimated that 92 percent were men and only 8 percent 
women.”272 The gendered definitions of civilian and combatant influenced humanitarian 
policy within Bosnia and, arguably, cost many men their lives. 
Libyan aid recipient discourse in 2011 did not challenge this aspect of the 
humanitarian narrative, but rather, reinforced it. Libyans’ themselves helped women and 
children evacuate dangerous areas, leaving men behind to fight. Libyanproud tweeted, 
“#dheba: 100’s of Pickup trucks packed with children & women fleeing the #nafousa 
mountain.”273 Similarly, Thanku4theanger, tweeted “Luckily they managed to move the 
women/kids to other parts of Nafousa” and “1000 have arrived safely in Benghazi from 
Misrata today mainly wounded, elderly, women and children.”274 Libyans focused their 
own evacuation efforts on “women and children” because of the norm that these groups 	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are especially in need of protection and security. While adult men were not being 
systematically killed like they were in Bosnia, the men were still targeted more than 
women and children since they were more likely to be rebel fighters or a threat to the 
Gaddafi regime. Most of the deaths in Libya were a result of the regime suppressing rebel 
fighters. At minimum, women were certainly not in more danger than men such that they 
needed to be prioritized in evacuation efforts. 
Further strengthening these gender norms, Libyans used the stereotype of women 
as innocent civilians to their advantage. When Libyans’ tweeted about injuries or 
atrocities perpetrated by Gaddafi’s regime against peaceful protesters, they often-focused 
on injuries to women. Libyanproud tweeted, “#gaddafi forces hv taken over the hospital 
area, injured civilians inc women and children in dire need of assistance !#nafoursa.”275 
Feb17Libya tweeted, “#Ajdabiya doctor describes woman shot in chest 3-4 times, beaten 
cut & disfigured in last trimester of pregnancy.”276 This focus on harm to women makes 
sense because it’s how they sell their cause as a humanitarian one and not just a political 
one. Because women are seen as innocent civilians, regardless of the actual truth, it is 
most advantageous for Libyans to broadcast injuries to women when trying to attract the 
world’s attention and international aid.  
Another common trend throughout the Libya tweets were reports of sexual 
violence against Libyan women. For example, OmarAlmoktar tweeted a picture with the 
message, “Woman cries for help, says abused by Gaddafi men.”277 And Tripolitanian 
tweeted, “Reports of hundreds of women raped by #Gaddafi forces in #Libya, their lives, 
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ruined, families broken.”278 Similar reports of sexual violence were prevalent in mass 
media coverage of Bosnia; there were numerous stories of young girls getting raped.279 
When Libyans and Bosnians report sexual assault against women they are not just 
demonstrating how Gaddafi or the Serbs harm innocent civilians. Such reports 
characterize the men of Gaddafi’s regime and the Serbs as animalistic and evil, and 
demonstrate how important women’s sexuality, or purity, is within Libyan and Bosnian 
culture. 
Sexual violence against women is often used by aid organizations to justify 
women as a vulnerable population. While instances of rape must be reported and 
broadcasted, focusing only on sexual violence against women is misleading. Such 
gendered discourse hides the fact that there were some reports of Gaddafi forces raping 
women and men. Feb17Libya tweeted a documentary translated into English and 
explained that it “speaks of #Gaddafi rapes of boys, girls, men, and women.”280 
Unfortunately, Feb17Libya was one of the only Libyans to mention sexual assault as a 
problem for both genders. Similarly, experts claim male rape and sexual torture were 
weapons of war during the conflict in Bosnia and Croatia. While 20,000 women were 
raped from 1992-1995 during the Bosnia war, the number of males raped is unknown. 
Human rights activists in Bosnia claim “at least several hundred men were victims of this 
crime, but not a single trial, either at the Hague war crimes tribunal or in local courts, has 
focused solely on the rape of sexual abuse of men.”281 There may statistically be more 
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women than men who suffer from war-rape, but it’s important not to define rape as a 
women-only problem through our discourse. 
Another reason for categorizing women as innocent and vulnerable in 
humanitarian discourse is their unique role as mothers. Carpenter explains: 
“Women have historically been associated with child rearing as well as 
with the civilian sector; indeed women’s general exclusion from the 
formal armed forces as often been justified in terms of their roles as 
caregivers. Thus, the special protections that have accrued to women 
under the international humanitarian law have traditionally addressed 
primarily their specific needs as mothers rather than the broader 
difficulties they face as a result of gender hierarchies prevalent in society 
before and during armed conflict.“282 
 
“Women as mothers” is a constant theme within the dominant humanitarian narrative 
because it characterizes women as peaceful caretakers and not combatants.  This 
caretaker role may seem to contradict the representation of women as helpless and in 
need of protection, but it’s important to recognize that caretaker is different than 
protector. Women may be expected to care for wounded soldiers or cook meals for them, 
but they are not to engage in, or suffer, violence for men. This narrative of women as 
non-violent is dangerous because men are defined in contrast to women. Thus, civilian 
men are not seen as peaceful and are unfairly treated as combatants. Additionally, the 
women-as-mothers theme “suggests that women’s needs can be boiled down to those 
specific to mothers” and “marginalizes the importance of fathering.”283 In the news 
coverage of Bosnia, many articles focused on the suffering that occurs when a mother is 
separated from her children.284 And almost all reports of “suffering women” were either 
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about them being raped or losing their children to an attack.285 Women within the 
humanitarian narrative during the Bosnian crisis could not have an identity independent 
of their role as mothers and wives in need of protection. 
While reports on Bosnia highlighted the suffering of females only in terms of 
their roles as wives and mothers, reports on Libya highlighted the political resistance of 
females only in terms of their role as wives and mothers.  Discourse from Libya tweets 
often celebrated the bravery or dedication of women involved in the revolution, but the 
discourse still focused on their roles as mothers and wives. For example, OmarAlmoktar 
tweeted, “Women in Misurata sent three of her sons out, and says: do not come back 
unless Gaddafi is dead, HOW BRAVE.”286 While I do not believe OmarAlmoktar 
intended this tweet as sarcasm, it could be interpreted as such by someone who did not 
believe in women fulfilling peaceful caretaking roles while men fought. Similarly, 
Thanku4theanger tweeted about how he was “talking with the wife of a martyr whose 
demonstrated every single day at the London Libya embassy since #Feb17.”287 He went 
on to describe her as on of the inspirational Libyan women whose “courage, fortitude and 
intelligence is second to none.”288 Not only are these women being celebrated for their 
sacrifices as mothers and wives instead of as Libyans, but it also seems like there’s a 
lower standard or expectation for women revolutionaries compared to men. 
While the tweets characterized women as peaceful caretakers, they also re-
entrenched stereotypes of men as violent, strong and aggressive. For example, 
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Libyansrevolt tweeted a video of men fighting in Kufra with the tweet, “this is what real 
men are about #libya #feb17.”289 Similarly, Thanku4theanger tweeted a video of a man 
on a hospital bed with serious injuries preaching about his desire to die for his country. 
Thanku4theanger commented on the video saying, “This is why Azzawyia will kick 
Gaddafi’s ass. Men like this #EpicLibyanMan.”290 The tweets perpetuate the idea that all 
real men are combatants. They characterize men who are not on the frontlines getting 
shot as dishonorable or lacking in their masculinity.  
The Gaddafi regime and pro-Gaddafi Libyans also harnessed the power of gender 
norms in strategic ways. Libyan Twitter user, Dmgariany, who was against the Libya 
revolution tweeted a video of a pro-Gaddafi rally in Sirte, Libya, Gaddafi’s hometown.291 
It showed a large protest with singing and chanting. Everyone was dressed in green and 
waving green flags in support of the Gaddafi regime. Interestingly, though, everyone was 
either a woman or a child. Girls who looked as young as nine were making enthusiastic 
speeches into the microphone. The women and children ridiculed Nicholas Sarkozy, 
denounced the war, shot guns into the air, and praised their leader Gaddafi.292  
Such a protest is strategic because women and children are symbols of peace and 
victimhood. In this way, pro-Gaddafi forces can characterize the revolutionaries as the 
violent perpetrators threatening innocent civilians and portray an image of Gaddafi as the 
protector of the civilian non-combatants. Had there been pro-Gaddafi men protesting and 
shooting guns into the air in a mob, the international community would see them as a 
threat to innocent Libyans and combatants within the humanitarian conflict. By contrast, 	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the women and children protesters can gain sympathy from the international community 
and send an innocuous, non-threatening message to stop the revolution. 
Of course, women can be used in other ways to draw attention to a humanitarian 
cause. The same anti-revolutionary Libyan Twitter user, Dmagariany, also tweeted, 
“#Women whip off shirts in #Qaddafi’s support #Libya,” with a link to an article about 
two RU-FEMEN Russian activists who stood outside the European Union in Moscow 
wearing Bikinis and holding mattresses with Gaddafi’s portrait on them. The women 
claimed the intervention in Libya was because the EU leaders sleep on “awful, old 
mattresses” and thus do not get enough sleep.”293 As a result, they have health problems 
and are mad at the whole world. The women chanted, “Make Love, not War!” and 
“Mattress and breasts – forget about the war!”294 While this is an extreme example, it 
highlights how women can be used as part of protests and revolutionary movements, be 
characterized as active political agents, but still reinforce harmful gender norms and 
stereotypes.  
Ultimately, the gender norms embedded within the traditional humanitarian 
narrative are present in the Libyan aid recipient discourse just as they were present in 
mass media coverage of Bosnia. It may be the case that Libyans challenged other 
representations within the dominant humanitarian narrative, like that of aid providers and 
aid recipients, because such representations are limited to humanitarianism and not 
ingrained in them through their cultures. The static identities of aid recipients and aid 
providers perpetuated by the dominant narrative are easier to challenge because Libyans, 
who have not always been aid recipients, understand themselves as something different 	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than the dominant narrative suggests. However, gender norms and stereotypes are so 
entrenched within Libyan culture and society, like most other places, and thus are more 
difficult to challenge. It is easier to resist the initial framing or constitution of identities 
imposed during a humanitarian crisis than reverse constituted understandings of gender 
that have long existed both within and outside of humanitarianism. 
 Therefore, Libyan Twitter users challenge the dominant humanitarian narrative’s 
representations of aid recipients and providers, and further challenges the hero-victim 
narrative through disruptive images of suffering and subversive uses of humor and satire. 
Libyan Twitter users only fail to challenge the dominant humanitarian narrative in their 
representations of gender since they perpetuate the women-as-weak and women-as-
mothers stereotypes that are integral to the dominant narrative and traditional 
humanitarian practices. The next step is to determine whether this Libyan Twitter 
discourse can influence larger discourses, specifically mass media representations of the 
humanitarian crisis in Libya. 
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Chapter 6 
 
Aid Recipient Discourse Influences Mass Media 
 
 
Now that I have established that Libyan aid recipient discourse challenges the 
dominant humanitarian narrative, the question is whether such discourse has the potential 
to transform the larger normative context within which humanitarianism operates. There 
can be discourses contrary to normative understandings, but if those discourses remain 
isolated within a particular subculture – be it Libyans or Twitter users – then they will 
never reshape the dominant narrative and transform the normative context of 
humanitarianism. Transformative discourse can start small and grow to infiltrate larger 
discourses and practices over time, eventually reframing our natural understandings. 
In order to determine if Libyans’ twitter discourse influences the broader 
discourse, I analyze 2011 mass media coverage of Libya in comparison with the mass 
media coverage of Bosnia and Libyan aid recipient discourse.  This analysis shows the 
Libyan use of images of suffering and humor to challenge the dominant narrative did not 
transfer to mass media discourse. However, Libyan Twitter representations of aid 
recipients and aid providers, which challenged the dominant hero-victim narrative, did 
appear in mass media coverage of Libya. Moreover, the mass media coverage of Libya 
integrated aid recipient voices into their news reports and broadcasted Libyans’ tweets 
throughout the world.  
Overall, I determine that Libyan Twitter discourse influenced mass media 
representations of aid recipients and providers in the Libyan crisis, but mass media still 
cannot portray multifaceted identities. When Libyan Twitter users represented aid 
recipients as political activists instead of passive victims, mass media stopped paying lip 
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service to humanitarian aspects of the Libyan conflict, like the suffering of Libyans, and 
focused primarily on Libyans’ political and military efforts. Mass media is ultimately 
restricted by its economic structure and must essentialize identities in order to tell a short 
and moving story. 
Libyan images of suffering portrayed by mass media were much like the Bosnian 
images of suffering portrayed by mass media. Like the photographs taken during the 
Bosnian conflict in 1994, the photos of Libyans suffering were often of destructed 
property or injured children and fighters. While there were some images of suffering, 
there was nothing completely shocking, grotesque or deeply disturbing. Like in the 
photograph of the dead Bosnian boys killed while sledding, Libyan injuries and fatalities 
were depicted, but covered up with bandages or sheets. For example, one of the more 
powerful shots in mass media coverage of Libya is a photograph of a doctor leaning on 
the bed of a dying five-year-old girl with a shrapnel or bullet wound to her head.295 The 
photograph did not show the girl’s head or injury, but just her legs and the hopelessness 
of the doctor at her bedside. Similarly, another photograph depicted a four-year-old from 
Misrata with a shrapnel wound to the head, but his head was fully wrapped in bandages, 
which spares the audience from witnessing the shock and gore of his injury.296 The 
nauseating and gruesome photographs of suffering that were constantly tweeted during 
the Libyan crisis did not appear in the major newspapers’ articles on Libya.  
Considering the absence of graphic photos from most major newspapers, there are 
likely official or unofficial publishing standards that determine what kind of photos are 	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appropriate to show the public. Newspaper outlets are held financially accountable by 
owners and investors and would be financially disadvantaged if they published gory 
images that turned off their readership. Thus, the disruptive imagery shared by Libyan aid 
recipients through Twitter may be unique to their ad hoc method of communication. 
While those disruptive images can still affect the way people think about suffering, the 
images may not gain enough traction to overcome traditional images of suffering since 
the mass media is restricted to images consistent with the dominant humanitarian 
narrative of suffering. 
Additionally, the mass media reports on Libya lacked the same humor and ironic 
critiques that were common among Libyan Twitter users. This use of humor, much like 
the disruptive images of suffering, is limited to Twitter users because of the informal and 
grassroots method of communication that is Twitter. Libyan aid recipients do not have 
the same responsibility to remain serious like journalists do. Moreover, because the 
Libyans identify as members of the “suffering group” they stand in a better position to 
make light of the crisis and its surrounding politics compared to journalists writing from 
the safety of their own home or from the field but with the option to leave at any time. 
While some of the Libyan Twitter users’ discursive tactics did not appear in mass 
media discourse, mass media coverage of Libya did reconstruct the humanitarian 
narrative by challenging the static identities of aid providers and aid recipients within 
Libya. First, mass media newspapers representation of aid providers called into question 
the basic hero-victim narrative. In 2011, the mass media was much more critical of 
NATO and its role in Libya than was mass media in 1993. The coverage on Bosnia 
focused plenty on NATO forces and the no-fly zone, but the language was mostly 
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descriptive. Journalists reported on new NATO decisions and NATO missions, but rarely 
were they evaluative of NATO. When coverage of NATO was evaluative, it was usually 
positive. For example, John Kifner reported, “NATO threats of air strikes have stopped 
the fighting around Sarajevo and increased somewhat the sense of security, permitting 
people to line up for food at a public kitchen.”297  
 Of course, it’s important to recognize mass media in Bosnia was very critical of 
NATO and other international actors prior to the NATO intervention; media played a 
major role in mobilizing the international community to intervene.298 However, the time 
period I analyze is after NATO has taken on its heroic role and began taking action. It 
may be that mass media was able to criticize NATO because it was failing to act out its 
role prescribed by the humanitarian narrative, but once NATO stepped into its role as the 
hero, criticism faded. Mass media coverage of Libya, on the other hand, continued to 
critique NATO even after NATO took on its role as hero and established a no-fly zone. 
In 2011, mass media sources were critical of NATO’s involvement in Libya and 
of NATO itself.  Newspaper articles reporting on Libya referred to NATO as 
“heterogeneous”299 and an “image of disarray”300 that has an “aggressive image in the 
Arab world.”301 At the same time, most articles and editorials taking an evaluative stance 
on NATO criticized it for not doing enough and for being ineffective in what it does try 	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to do.302 One article reported, “there’s a delay in reacting and lack of response to what’s 
going on on the ground.”303 Another quoted a Libyan doctor who said, “though NATO 
planes were heard flying overhead, there have been few airstrikes against Gaddafi 
positions, leaving people in the town feeling abandoned and betrayed.” 304  He 
characterized it as a no-safe zone instead of a no-fly zone.305 Finally, mass media made 
sure to cover some of NATO’s more embarrassing mistakes like when it accidentally 
attacked Libyan rebel forces. For example, after rebel tanks were shot at from the sky, 
journalists spoke with the rebels’ commander, Abdul Fattah Younis, who said, “if NATO 
had attacked their tanks, it was a mistake, and if Gaddafi’s airplanes had been allowed to 
strike them, it was an even bigger mistake.”306  
Not only did the newspaper articles criticize NATO, but they also demanded 
NATO work more cooperatively with Libyan rebel troops. For example, a New York 
Times editorial argued that NATO “should find a way to share relevant information with 
the rebels.”307 Moreover, representations of humanitarian aid were not limited to only 
international organizations; the media recognized the role of local Libyans within the 
humanitarian effort. For example, the Italian aid organization, Emergency, was 
introduced as an organization “helping Misurata’s doctors.”308 Additionally, journalists 
reported on their conversations with Libyan rebels and the arrangements the rebels were 	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making with the international aid group, Doctors Without Borders, to bring in supplies 
and evacuate injured men.309 The mass media coverage encouraged and highlighted 
cooperation between international aid organizations and the Libyans, which removes the 
image of the benevolent provider and helpless victim that is so integral to the dominant 
humanitarian narrative. Finally, a story of a Libyan countryman saving the life of a 
NATO pilot received a lot of attention in the press. A NATO plane malfunctioned over 
Libya. The pilot, who parachuted to the ground, was met by Libyans living on the 
countryside who embraced him and brought him to safety.310 The hero-victim role we 
understand as inherent to humanitarian aid was reversed; the recipient became the savior 
for the helpless NATO pilot. 
This critical perspective of NATO and empowered characterization of Libyans 
challenges the dominant humanitarian narrative that represents aid providers as flawless 
heroes there to save incapable rebels. It is difficult to prove Libyan’s Twitter discourse 
played a direct causal role in the transformation of mass media discourse on Libya. 
However, as seen in the analysis above, many journalists communicated with, and 
received news from, Libyan rebels, doctors and civilians on the ground, which is likely 
due to improved communication technology. These new voices provide a more complex 
and critical perspective of the humanitarian aid they receive compared to traditional 
voices in humanitarian discourse – like governments and international institutions. 
Discourse, emerging from new communication technologies, gives journalists in mass 
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media new normative understandings of the humanitarian crisis, which leads them to 
challenge parts of the dominant humanitarian narrative. 
The second way mass media coverage of Libya appears to challenge the dominant 
humanitarian narrative is through its representation of aid recipients. Civilian protests 
throughout Libya received much attention from the mass media. One photo in the New 
York Times depicted crowds of Libyans outside the courthouse in Benghazi while the 
rebel government began to take form311, and another showed a Libyan in Benghazi 
cheering as “rocket launchers headed to the front near Brega.”312 Many other photos 
showed massive anti-Gaddafi protests where “Libyans waved signs describing Gaddafi as 
a genocidal butcher and displayed photographs of dead Libyans.” 313  Pro-Gaddafi 
civilians were also shown as politically active and engaged. For example, one photograph 
depicted a woman carrying “a portrait of Colonel Qaddafi during a rally in his support in 
front of the Rixos Hotel in Tripoli.”314 Aid recipients are portrayed in mass media 
newspapers as empowered political agents fighting for freedom, or for the pro-Gaddafi 
protesters - stability, but either way, they are portrayed as engaged civilians, activists, and 
even fighters. Instead of discussing aid recipients as vulnerable, journalists are quoting 
John McCain, Senior United States Senator, talk about how exciting and inspirational it 
was to see Libyans protesting in the streets.315 There was very little coverage of the 
suffering, victimization, or helplessness of the Libyan people. Through new mass media 	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discourse, the Libyan aid recipients received admiration instead of pity – they were re-
politicized just like they were through Libyan Twitter discourse. 
The newspapers’ rhetorical framing of aid recipients also challenges the dominant 
humanitarian narrative. While the journalists didn’t go as far as the Libyans on Twitter, 
who used the term martyr to describe any Libyan killed by the Gaddafi regime, the 
journalists did avoid the term “victim” throughout most of their reporting. Interestingly, 
the only time the term victim was even used in a Washington Post article about Libya 
during the two-month period was when the author was making a comparison to the 
Bosnian crisis and he described the Muslim population of Bosnia as victimized.316 These 
small shifts in rhetoric can begin to reshape global images of aid recipients in 
humanitarian crises.  
Through empowering representations of aid recipients, mass media also reshaped 
what constitutes a justification for humanitarian aid; capable, not helpless, aid recipients 
best justify contributions of humanitarian aid. Ambassador Ali Suleiman Aujali, the 
official representative to the United States of the Transitional National Council of the 
Libyan Republic and the former Libyan ambassador to the United States published an 
article in the Washington Post. Aujali spoke on behalf of Libyans, exclaiming, “We will 
create a governing body that represents all Libyans. We will create a judicial system. We 
will create a free press. And we will ensure the delivery of basic services, such as health 
care, schools, roads and water.”317 Aujali is explaining that Libyans are willing to do the 
work, but that they need aid to get through the war. “We are literally fighting for our 
lives. All of our aspirations will mean little unless we get the help we need now.” The 	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plea for aid is not made in the context of hopelessness and desperation as seen in Bosnia 
and dominant narratives of humanitarianism. By contrast, Aujali’s argument for aid is 
based on how much Libyans are fighting, sacrificing, and working to institute change. He 
is ensuring states that if they can help, Libya will stand on its own two feet again and will 
not be a constant burden on the international community. It is the agency and efforts of 
capable Libyans that warrant humanitarian assistance.  
It is possible to argue that mass media’s representation of aid and aid recipients is 
due to better communication technology and not due to how the Libyans used, and 
expressed themselves, through that new technology. However, the parallels between the 
ways mass media news sources and Libyans characterized aid and aid recipients should 
be sufficient evidence that the Libyan Tweets influenced mass media discourse. And at a 
minimum, we know Libyan Twitter discourse influenced mass media coverage of Libya 
to some extent because many aid recipients tweets were actually integrated into mass 
media reports.   
Reporters acknowledged Twitter was continuously breaking news faster than the 
major news outlets. “Video clips that appeared online rapidly – ahead even of the news 
agency reports – were said to show demonstrations on Thursday night in the eastern town 
of Al Qatif.”318 However, news agencies were cautious about integrating a lot of the news 
reported through Twitter since it was difficult to immediately verify. Still, they did 
integrate some of the information tweeted from Libyans on the ground, especially footage 
of protests.  For example, the New York Times reported, “a Twitter user, Chan'ad 
Bahraini, posted a link to this video and translated the protesters' chant as: ‘Sunni and 	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Shia are brothers - this homeland is not for sale.’”319 Finally, all three newspapers 
recognized the importance of opening up communication networks within Libya to 
ensure “that Libyans can communicate with the outside world.”320 Media sources were 
willing and eager to broadcast Libyan aid recipient voices from the ground. If aid 
recipients continue to challenge the dominant humanitarian narrative through new 
communication technology, their voices will further reverberate beyond the Internet and 
throughout the world. 
The above analysis indicates Libyan Twitter discourse did have some influence 
on mass media discourse.  Libyans’ representations of recipients and providers, which 
challenged the dominant humanitarian narrative, reappeared in mass media reports on 
Libya. However, in my analysis of mass media discourse on Libya, something seemed to 
be missing. While the newspaper articles talked about Libyans’ protest movements and 
rebel fighters’ successes, they rarely talked about the Libyans trapped in their homes, 
surrounded by violence, and unable to attain basic resources. While they briefly 
referenced civilians getting killed in protests, they rarely spent time highlighting the 
stories about innocent civilians being killed or injured by the state, nor did they focus 
much on the plight of refugees fleeing Libya. Mass media adopted Libyans’ 
representation of themselves as politically active martyrs, but then stopped talking about 
their suffering or vulnerability. 
Similarly, the newspaper reports on Libya focus primarily on NATO military 
efforts, including the maintenance of the no-fly zone and strategizing with rebel forces. 	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Only a few articles talk about non-military humanitarian aid, and they are almost all 
about supplies that cannot be delivered for security reasons. There was much less 
discussion about humanitarian NGO aid efforts and refugee camps compared to the 
newspaper reports on Bosnia in 1994.  It appears that while mass media was willing to 
stop glamorizing aid providers like NATO and even adopt a more critical stance toward 
them, they stopped talking about providers of non-military humanitarian aid.  
By contrast, Libyan Twitter discourse was much more effective at representing 
aid recipients and providers with multifaceted identities. While they would tell 
empowering stories about rebel fighters and martyrs protesting, they also highlighted 
tragedies and suffering through images, anecdotes, and news updates. Libyan Twitter 
discourse, compared to the mass media reports, spent more time talking about the 
civilians’ purely humanitarian needs and the aid providers that were not engaged in the 
civil war. Therefore, mass media may be structurally bound to stereotypes and the 
construction of flat, incomplete identities because it must sell a story, a narrative, of the 
humanitarian crisis. Ignatieff describes the limiting structure of media as a form of 
communication: 
It derives its revenue and influence from its capacity to make the delivery 
of information pleasurable. Pleasurable story lines are generally simple, 
gripping, and easy to understand. Now all moral life requires 
simplification, and all forms of moral identification proceeds by way of 
fictions. In framing up our moral world, we all seek for good guys and bad 
guys, innocent victims and evil perpetrators.321 
 
Media must assign roles to all the characters in the story and construct relationships 
between them. Libyans’ may have influenced the media to portray them as powerful, 
political agents, but not without a cost.  	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 If they are powerful political agents then they cannot also be suffering victims of 
a humanitarian crisis. Given the limits of mass media, the Libyans can pick one identity, 
or the other, but not both. This is difficult for Libyan aid recipients because while a 
powerful and political identity is necessary to protect them from harmful intervention and 
post-intervention policies, and to maintain their own self worth, recognition of their 
suffering and victimhood can be important too. The victim-aspect of Libyans’ identity 
cultivates humanitarian aid outside of weaponry and military support; it can strengthen 
legal cases against the perpetrators; and it can help contextualize, and justify, the violence 
both for them and the international community.  This is not all to say that the Libyan aid 
recipient discourse is ineffective or harmful in the way it influences larger humanitarian 
discourse. Rather, it’s just important to note the limited ways Libyan Twitter discourse 
can influence larger discourse and the potential disadvantages to Libyans constructing 
empowered aid recipient identities. 
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Chapter 7 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
Libyans’ discourse through Twitter did challenge the dominant hero-victim 
narrative, and their discourse did influence, even if in limited ways, mass media 
representations’ of the Libyan humanitarian crisis. While mass media discourse in Bosnia 
reflected the narrative of the altruistic heroes saving the helpless weak victims, the 
Libyan Twitter discourse represented aid recipients as empowered and politically 
engaged and represented aid providers as flawed moral characters obligated to intervene. 
The Twitter discourse also used disturbing images of suffering and humorous satire to 
disrupt the dominant humanitarian narrative, forcing us to question our assumptions and 
basic understandings of the Libyan conflict, human suffering and the humanitarian 
enterprise. The only areas of analysis in which the Libyan Twitter users did not challenge 
basic tenants of the dominant narrative was in their representation of gender; both Twitter 
users reporting on Libya and mass media news outlets reporting on Bosnia characterized 
women as weak and child-like with identities dependent on their role as mothers and 
wives. 
The Libyan Twitter users’ disruptive discourse went beyond the Twitter-sphere 
and even the World Wide Web.  The way they represented the conflict and the actors 
involved came through in mass media reporting on the Libyan crisis. Newspaper articles 
from the New York Times, Washington Post and USAToday did not use humor or 
disturbing images like the Libyan Twitter users, but they did represent aid recipients as 
empowered political agents and aid providers as imperfect agents, obligated to support 
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Libya’s rebel movement. However, the media still stripped the crisis of complexity and 
nuance and only represented Libyans as political fighters instead of also suffering people, 
but this may be a structural feature of mass media that is difficult to overcome. Overall, 
Libyans within Libya, or at least in constant contact with family and friends within Libya, 
were able to harness the power of Twitter and alter humanitarian discourse in the context 
of the Libyan humanitarian crisis. They subverted traditional media hierarchies and were 
able to control their own humanitarian narrative. 
Because discourse constructs normative contexts, and normative contexts have the 
power to constitute our understandings of reality, shifts in discourse, like the one 
highlighted in this paper, should, slowly and over time, lead to shifts in behavior. When 
assumptions and perceived identities within the humanitarian narrative change, it makes 
sense that those involved in humanitarian work – namely states and international aid 
organizations – will adapt their practices to fit their newfound understandings. However, 
it is too early to know whether Libyan Twitter discourse has influenced, or will influence, 
future state and NGO policy in relation to Libya. And it is certainly too early to know if 
the Libyan discourses of resistance will help reconstruct the larger normative context that 
is humanitarianism. In fact, considering all the confounding variables, we may never 
know whether Libyan aid recipients’ voices and perspectives, after being broadcasted 
throughout the world, influenced the way states and international aid organizations 
approached the situation in Libya and future humanitarian crises. 
With that said, it is important to realize the ultimate suggestion I make – that aid 
recipient voices could reshape normative understandings of humanitarianism and 
revolutionize the practice of humanitarianism – is not that radical. The normative context 
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of humanitarianism, often dictated by the dominant hero-victim narrative, can, and is 
beginning to, shift. The shift in common understandings of humanitarianism has already 
begun as a result of the technological revolution and the voices it has empowered. 
State governments are increasingly cooperating with the diaspora from regions of conflict 
to gain intelligence and provide effective humanitarian aid. For example, “the State 
Department’s Africa Bureau has been nurturing relationships with [Somali] diaspora 
communities in Seattle, Washington; Minneapolis, Minnesota; and Columbus, Ohio.”322 
The State Department receives feedback about which U.S. policies in Somalia are 
working and which are not. Moreover, because Somali diaspora sends $1 billion worth of 
remittances back to relatives in Somalia, which is about 85% of Somalia’s GDP, the State 
Department believes that organizing the diaspora to fund community humanitarian 
projects could prove powerful.323 Finally, President Barak Obama’s “National Strategy 
for Counterterrorism” emphasizes the importance of working with the Somalia Diaspora 
to gain both intelligence and regional influence in order to combat terrorist groups in 
Somalia.324  
The U.S. government has started working with aid recipients on the ground in 
regions of conflict to help them take part in their own humanitarian protection. For 
example, in the Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the conflict between the 
National Congress for the Defense of People (CNDP) and pro-government militias has 
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left civilians suffering.325 The CNDP are infamous for organized mass rapes of innocent 
civilians. In fact, two out of every three women in select regions of the DRC are 
survivors of rape.326 Alec Ross, Senior Advisor for Innovation to Former Secretary of 
State Hillary Clinton, spear headed a program to provide women in the DRC with mobile 
phones so they can warn each other about upcoming rebel attacks.  With this new 
technology, the women have created a network through emails and text messages to alert 
each other about rebel movements and attacks.327 In this way, women in the DRC become 
protectors of one another; they are simultaneously giving and receiving aid. This kind of 
humanitarian policy reflects a radical transformation of humanitarian norms, including 
what we understand aid to be and how we understand the identities of women in the 
DRC. 
International aid organizations have also been investing in new programs that 
integrate aid recipient voices and involve recipients in the allocation and distribution of 
aid. Many organizations have started using crowd sourcing to determine which areas are 
in most urgent need of aid and gain intelligence about the situation on the ground. For 
example, Ushahidi is a nonprofit organization that provides software for information 
collection and interactive mapping. The organization builds “tools for democraticing 
information, increasing transparency and lowering the barriers for individuals to share 
their stories.”328 It claims to be a “disruptive organization that is willing to take risks in 
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the pursuit of changing the traditional way that information flows.” 329  This 
crowdsourcing technology enables aid recipients to report on the conditions and threats in 
their area so aid organizations know which areas are most vulnerable, least secure, etc. 
For example, during the 2011 elections in the DRC, there was a Ushahidi map tracking 
where there was limited media access, humanitarian needs, violence, suppression of 
demonstrations, corruption, etc.330 
Similar crowd sourcing technology was used after the 2007 presidential election 
in Kenya. Following the election, there was an eruption of political and ethnic conflict. 
Oxfam funded the efforts of Kenyan human rights activists to create a text-messaging 
‘nerve center’. A UN report on Wireless Technology for Social Change stated: 
[The] center served as a vital tool for conflict management and prevention 
by providing a hub for real-time information about actual and planned 
attacks between rival ethnic and political groups. The text messages, sent 
in by human rights advocates, religious leaders, and others, were then 
relayed to local Peace Committees for response.331 
 
Average citizens were also encouraged to use the text-messaging center to report any acts 
of violence because it enabled policemen or elders to quickly respond to incidents and 
quell the violence. According to rights activists in Kenya, this program effectively 
prevented many violent incidents in the aftermath of the election and may have 
preemptively countered devastating civil unrest. A local citizen learned about a pending 
attack against a camp for internally displaced people and sent a text to the ‘nerve center.’ 
As a result, the Peace Committee was alerted of the situation and was able to prevent the 
attack by talking with the parties involved.332 The new communication technology 	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enabled Kenyan citizens to play an integral role in averting a violent humanitarian crisis 
and empowered local leaders to unite and cooperate in an attempt to maintain peace and 
stability. 
This mapping, generated by aid recipients, was also helpful during humanitarian 
crises as a result of natural disasters. For example, Télécoms Sans Frontières (TSF), or 
Telecoms Without Borders, is an NGO headquartered in France that uses mobile 
telecommunications to help reestablish communication networks in the response to and 
management of humanitarian crises. Immediately after the earthquake hit Peru in 2007, 
TSF set up telecommunication centers to enable local residents to contact family and 
friends and to direct international NGOs to where the need was greatest. Over 17 
agencies and 1,400 families accessed TSF’s services during its time in Peru.333 Mobile 
phones were also useful during the floods in Bihair, India in 2008. Aid recipients used 
them to inform local administration about their situation, including the need and urgency 
for food and drinking water. Information about the status of affected areas helped the 
administration and humanitarian organizations take steps early on to deliver aid to the 
right areas.334 
Additionally, aid recipients’ use of mobile devices saved lives after the 
earthquake in Haiti. While the earthquake destroyed a lot of infrastructure, most cell 
towers remained intact. Tuft’s Fletcher School set up the Ushahidi map for Haiti where 
anyone in Haiti could submit reports through text message or online. Haitians submitted 
reports about the location of fires, trapped people, medical crises, public health needs, 
security needs, and infrastructure damage. Aid recipients used the map to direct aid 	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organizations and make their needs transparent.335 This new use of communication 
technology elevates the status of aid recipients because they can take a leading role in 
their own aid efforts; they direct aid organizations to certain locations and inform them 
about what kind of aid is needed. 
Such information collecting technology can also be used to learn about aid 
recipients’ experiences and what they think should be done to best bring peace and 
stability to their region. For example, Ushahidi, Souktel, Crowdflower, the African 
Diaspora Institute and Al Jazeera partnered to provide a forum for Somali citizens to 
share their opinions about the crisis in Somalia. Souktel had a SMS subscriber list of over 
50,000 Somalis. They texted them, “Al Jazeera wants to know: how has the conflict of 
the last few months affected your life? Please include the name of your hometown in 
your response. Thank you!”336 In response, they received thousands of texts about the 
struggles of regular Somali citizens and what Somali’s think the international community 
could do. The organizations behind this program “hope that advocacy and lobby groups 
will be able to leverage the content generated by this project to redouble their efforts in 
response to the escalating crisis in Somalia.”337 Humanitarian and media organizations 
are organizing programs to empower aid recipient voices and include them in the 
international humanitarian dialogue. 
It may be unclear whether the discourses of resistance emerging from Libya, and 
other places around the world, are primarily responsible for the shift in policy highlighted 
above. While my argument is that the content of aid recipient discourse is the catalyst for 	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this shift, it may be that humanitarian practices have begun to integrate aid recipient 
voices and work with aid recipients as a result of new communication technology and not 
the content of those communications. Most likely, and consistent with the theoretical 
framework I’ve provided, the shifts in humanitarian policy taking place in the last ten 
years are a result of the emergence of new communication technology, as well as, how 
aid recipients have reframed humanitarianism through their discourse. Ultimately, we 
cannot know what the world would look like if aid recipients, in Libya and beyond, had 
used new communication technologies to reinforce the dominant humanitarian narrative. 
At a minimum though, new communication technologies are reshaping the dominant 
humanitarian narrative to empower aid recipients. And at best, aid recipients are using 
new communication technology to challenge the dominant humanitarian narrative and 
empower themselves within the humanitarian enterprise. 
I hope future research investigates whether Libyan aid recipients are unique in 
their tendency to challenge the dominant humanitarian narrative compared to other aid 
recipient populations. It would be interesting to know if this empowering aid recipient 
discourse is limited to Libyans, or revolutionaries within the Arab Spring, and not 
apparent in more traditional aid recipient populations. Interviews with different aid 
recipients in different kinds of crises could help us better understand how aid recipients 
understand the humanitarian narrative. Do they, on the whole, embrace their role as 
victims? Find the hero-victim story harmful or inaccurate? Or do they have an entirely 
different way of conceiving of humanitarianism and its surrounding discourses? Do aid 
recipients differ in their conceptions of humanitarianism and if so why? Additionally, 
future research should attempt to verify my argument through quantitative methods since 
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I lacked the time and resources to provide empirical verification of some of the larger 
discursive trends I observed within the data. Finally, future research should tease apart 
the ways new technology and aid recipients’ use of new technology influences the 
humanitarian narrative. This could be done through a comparative study of two current 
humanitarian crises where aid recipients’ voices are heard through social media, but the 
content of their communications are radically different. 
Such future research may come to a less optimistic conclusion than the one I have 
arrived at here. However, even if aid recipient discourse is, in the long run, not enough to 
overcome the dominant hero-victim narrative that has been constituted throughout 
history, the recognition of this narrative, its power, its dangers, and its potential to 
transform are important to both academics and policy-makers concerned about the 
humanitarian enterprise. The recognition of the humanitarian narrative and the way it 
influences our behavior is key to self-reflection, as individuals, NGOs, media outlets, and 
even states. Only by recognizing the forces guiding our behavior can we hope to change 
our behavior.   
And while we should be wary of the dominant humanitarian narrative and its 
harmful effects, it is also important to note that no matter how problematic the dominant 
humanitarian narrative might be, it is not a reason to give up on humanitarian efforts; it’s 
a reason to continuously try to transform our understandings of humanitarianism so that 
we are free to think and build more innovative and empowering forms of humanitarian 
aid. The goal of this paper is not to crush the humanitarian idealism born out of the early 
1990s, but to recognize that aid recipients may have the power to harness world’s 
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attention and humanitarian concern in a way that empowers aid recipients like never 
before.  
My analysis of Libyan Twitter discourse, compared with mass media discourse on 
Bosnia in 1994, has proven that there is at least the potential for aid recipient discourse to 
challenge the dominant humanitarian narrative, influence larger discourse, and, according 
to my theoretical framework, alter the normative context of humanitarianism, thus 
transforming humanitarian practices. The shifts in humanitarian policy we have seen so 
far may just be the tip of the iceberg. There may be radically different ways of aiding 
those suffering as a result of conflict or destitute economies that we cannot currently 
conceive of since we are trapped within a particular understanding of aid and 
humanitarianism. If aid recipient voices continue to challenge the dominant hero-victim 
narrative, disrupting our constituted realities, they may open our eyes to brand new 
perspectives and approaches to humanitarianism that better empower aid recipients and 
save lives. 
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